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PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S 
RA TIONAL CHOICES 
William W. Bratton '" 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1 983, the Republic of Peru guaranteed foreign bank borrowings of 
Banco de la Nacion and Banco Pop u l ar de Peru. Some years later, Peru and 
the two banks defau lted on this and much other external debt. Some years later 
still ,  in 1 996, most of Peru's bank lenders agreed to a composition. Under this, 
the 1983 instruments were exchanged for "Brady Bonds," with the bonds 
either stating a reduced p rincipal amount or paying a lower rate of interest. \ 
Elliott Associates, a holder of the 1 983 debt, held Ollt from the 
composition, refusing to participate. E l liott, a "vulture fund" specializin g  in 
obligations of distressed firms and countries," had p urchased $20.7 million face 
amou nt of Peru's 1983 debt at the discounted price of $1 1 .4 million from two 
intern ational banks while the restructuring n egotiations were ongoing.' El liott 
brought an action to e nforce the debt at face value in the Southern District of 
New York, a focal point venue in the emerging world of sovereign debt 
enforcement. Legal recourse against defaulting sovereigns is availabl e  in the 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This project began in conversations \\ith fvlitu 
Gulali. who bears no \"esponsibility whatsoever for the assertions mack herein. My thanks to D;wid Caris()n 
for his excellent comments 
I Declaration of Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld. '11'11 I. 8, Elliott Assocs .. L.P. \'. Banco de la Nncion 
(S.D.N.Y. Au!.!. 31. 20(0) (96 Civ. 7916) Ihcreinafter Lowcnfelcl Declar�llionl· 
2 These
�
hcdge funds typically purchase the debt of companies and countries that are in financial distress 
and. therefore. hold debt that is trading at a deep discount. Although even the Institute of International 
Finance-the global association of financial institutions-has publicly called for a targeted kgal strategy III 
counter the supposedly disruptive activities of nJitLlre funds in the context of sovereign restructurings. th�sc 
funds are not without their supporters. See John Dizard. A Ballkrul'l SO/lIIioll ro S()w:u:igll De!>l. Fl\.;. TI\IE:s . 
.Ian. 18, 2002. at 2-1 (arguing that there is nothing problematic about a vulture fund that purchases sO\'creign 
debt at a deep discount and then sues to be paid in full): VII/Illre HIIIII, FI:\. TI\,tES. May 7. 2002. at 20 (arguing 
that vulturc funds serve to provide much needed liquidity in the marKets for distressed sovereign dc:bt). from a 
supportive point of view. Elliott's enforcement action respecting Peruvian debt can be analogized [0 
enforcement of the securities laws by the plaintiffs bar. 
; Elliott /'-.>socs .. L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion. 194 F.3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1999) 
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courts of cou ntries like the United States and the United Kin gdom,
� 
even as 
sovereign immunity prevents direct enforcement of sovereign obligations in  
the obligors' own courts. E l liott emerged fro m  the Southern District with a 
judgment of $55,660,831.56.5 Unfortunately for sovereign creditors in E l liott's 
position, sLlch judgments have val u e  o n l y  to the extent the creditor can identify 
property of the defaulting sovereign in the jurisdiction of the judgment or 
another jurisdiction wil ling to levy execution. Sovereigns in defa u l t  rarel y  
leave val u ab l es lying around subject t o  attachment i n  creditor-friendly 
jurisdictions. 
E l l iott beat the odds and got paid. It relied on the 1983 debt contract's pari 
passu c laLlse, which provided, " The obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do 
rank and wil l  rank at least pari passu in priority of payment with a l l  other 
External Indebtedness of the Gu arantor, and interest thereon. 
, , (, E lliott took the 
clause to Brussels, the home of Euroclear, a c learing house through which 
funds from abroad enter the European banking system. Peru was abou t  to 
dispatch a l arge paymen t on its Brady Bonds to European holders via 
Eur oclear. E l liott, in an ex parte proceeding, persuaded the Belgian courts to 
block the payment on the ground that the pori passu clause gave the holders of 
the 1983 debt the right to participate pro rata in Peru's payments to other 
foreign creditors.7 Peru, not wishin g  to defau l t  on its Brady Bonds, paid Elliott 
in fu l l.x Since then, v u ltur e  investors have successfully repeated the tactic,') 
with mixed results. lo 
-I The statutes that relax the traditional sovereign ill1munity barrier are the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 2X USC.SS 1330, 1332(a)('+), 1:l91(t). 1'+'+I(d), 1602-1611 (2000). and the State Immunities Act. 1978, 
c, 33 (Eng.), l"I'IJrillled ill 1 7 I.L.M, 1123 (1978). 
5 Elliott Assocs" LP. \'. Banco de la Nacilln, No. 96 Civ. 7916 (RWS). 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1.+169 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,2(00); Lowenfeld Declaration, SllIJj'{/ note I, 'II 5. 
(, Lowenfeld Declaration. SlIJlro note I, 'II 9, 
7 Elliott Assocs., LP., General Docket No. 2000/QR!92 (CL App. of Brussels, 8th Chambcr, Sept. 26, 
2(00). 
� G. Miw Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sm'ereigl/ PimCL 56 Bus.I..·\w. 635, 636 (2001). 
'! In Belgiulll, for example, in Re/Jllhlic (�r NiCllmgllll \'. LNe /,I\'e.\{(!1'.\ LLC & Lllrocie([r RUllk SA, the 
COlllmercial Court of Brussels onee again issued an injunction, but lVas reversed in thc Cour D' Appel de 
Bruxelles in March 200.+ on the ground that Euroclear was not a proper pal1y to the litigation. 
10 COlllpore Kensington Int'I Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 2002 No. IOXX (Commercial Cl. Apr. 16,20(3) 
(refusing to enloin sovereign borrower from making payments of external indebtedness without proportional 
payment to the plaintiff ), oftd, 2003 WL 1935493 (c.J\. May 13.20(3), Hilll Red Mountain Fin., Inc, v. 
Dt:mocratic Republ ic of Congo. No. CY 00-016'+ R (C.D. Cal. \vlay 29, 200 I ) (rcfusi ng spcci fic performance 
of pwi 1"1.1.111 clause but enjoining sovercign borrower from making payments Ill' e.\tcrnal indebtedness without 
proportional payment to the plaintiff). 
A pending dClion in respect uf Republic of Congo deht lIses a IJ((ri /J([.IS11 clausc to ;)ssert a claim of 
wrliolls interfercnce with contract against a later lender \,\'ho received paymcnts. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. BNP 
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El l iott pu lled off i ts  Belgian caper at an inopportune t ime.  The reading of 
the pari  passu c lause operat ive in  the Belgian decis io n  strengthens the hands of 
creditors who wi thhold consent from sovereign debt compos i t ions .  The greater 
the potent ia l  rewards to dissenters, the harder compos it ions are to conclude. 
The more unstab le  the composi t ion process, the lon ger the duration and greater 
the intensi ty of sovereign di stress .  And in late 2000, at the t ime of the B elgian 
action, there loomed a sovereign debt cris is w ith a magnitude equaling 
emerging market (and part icular l y  Latin American ) defau l ts  of the 1930s and 
1980s . During the 1990s, emerging market bOITowers had turned to the bond 
markets to borrow hundreds of b i l l ions in dol lars and o ther cur encies . li By 
2000, market demand h ad fal len dramat ical ly as fear of d is tress intens ified.12 
Argentina was on  the brink of defaul t, which fol lowed i n  200 I. I n  2004, 
Argentina ' s debt restructuring process remains at an ear ly stage . I:; 
Actors i n  the world of sovere ign debt take a d im v iew of the Be lg ian 
injunction.  They dis miss it as the maneuvering of a rogue creditorl4 before a 
rogue court. IS It was, they charge, less ac t ion at l aw than piracy .  If) The Be lg ian 
court ,  moreo ver. got i t  wrong: Sovere ign debt contracts do not contemplate 
these en forcement actions. Composi tions make the majority of cooperative 
bondholders better off because they help to cure distress .  Accord ing ly, 
bondhoiders would be "crazy" to assent to debt contracts that he ld  out 
Pari bas SA. No. 03602569 ii'J.Y. Sup. Cl. Aug. 13,20(3). 8111 ( /  Nacional IOinancina. S.N.C. v .  Chase 
tvlallhallall Bank . 2003 WL 11;78-+15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. I-L 20(3) (Iwiding that puri /'USSII clause covering 
Mexican corporate borrower Illight SUpPllrt an injunction against its paying third party creditors hut did not 
SUppOI"[ an illlcrcreciitor action). 
II Between 1<)02 alld 1997. credit flo\\'ed copiously into emergi ng markets. averag ing 515-+ billiull each 
year. William W. Bratton 8:. G. iVlitu Gulati, Sm'ereigll Dehl He/film lIlId IiI!' Bel'l /llIeresl o( Creililorl'. 57 
VA'-:f). L. REV. (i"()rlhcomin\! 200-+). 
12 This happened at"te�· finan cial crises in East Asia and Russia in 1997 and I 99�. Lcnders Illay h.lve 
underc:stimated the l ikelihood of liqui dity nises and other economic distress. Alt.::rnativcly. they may h.lve 
assumed that troubled sovereigns would be b'liJeci out hy the lfvlF. S!'I' gel/em/Iv Daniel K. T'lrulio. RII/es. 
Di.l<Telio/l, 1II11/IIIII/writl' iii /lIlel"l/((!ioll(l/ Fill(//wiu/ Rejimll. -+ J. [NT'L ECO'i. L. 613 (200 I). 
1.1 Argentina has \lllered what  it savs is twenty-fivc cents on the dollar and II hat its credi tors say is ten 
cents on the dollar (di�;c\lunted 10 present I·.tiue). The creditors, who face a coordination problem of 
unprecl'dented dilllensi(1ns. are slollly getting themselves organized. An umbrclla Global COJ1)lIlilte<:: of 
ArgclHine Bondholder., I',as established \)Ii J anua ry 12. 200-+. [t rcpresents about half uf the pril'ate SC:Clor 
debt. IVlary Anastasi'l lYClrady . .  -\II/nil·us: ,'\lgeJl/illa P/n.'".\' 'Chickell' Wilh Ihe Jiv/F. W.\Ll. ST. J .. Jan. 30. 
200-1-. at A 13. 
t� See Patrick Bolton & David ,\. Skeel. Jr.. Inside Ihe 8/oc/.: Bor: f-{(J\i" S/u}[(/d II Sm·('I"ci,t.;1I /3ollk/"l/l)/c.'" 
Fr(II)/('\l'Ork Ik SII"lICI{{/"ed:). 5,1 E,\IUR y LJ. 763. 782 (200-1- i. 
15 Allna Clelpern. Buildillg (/ B,.II("1" Smlillg Char! .fin' SOl"("I"eigll Res/l"llclllriJlgs. 53 [\101<1' L.J. 1119, 
1127 (200-1-) (noting that the lenders' llrganil.aliol1 has gone on record saying that rogue cOLlns arc a b igge r 
dan�er than ro�lIe creditors!. 
[6 Clulati
�
& Klce . .I'll/1m 11Ote�. al6.j9. 
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encouragements to opportuni stic holdouts l ike E l l iott . 1 7 Meanwhile, pa ri passu 
clauses admit of a p lausible narrow interpretation that does not exten d  the right 
of payment asserted by the vu ltures .  
IS 
The contract i nterpretation issue soon may be jo ined i n  the S outhern 
Dis trict of New York, w here a class of Argentine bondholders has been 
certified i n  an enforcement action.19 Argentina, fearing aggressive use of pari 
/JCISSU clauses by these p laintiffs , already h as moved (without success) for an 
order precluding the p laintiffs from interfering w ith Argentina' s payments to 





support 0 I rgentll1a s motIon.-
The government intervenes i n  aid of its pol icy pOSItlOn respect ing the 
sovere ign debt cri s i s .  Many actors i n  the world of international finance, 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), would l ike to see a 
sovereign bankr up tcy reg ime ins tituted for the purpose of amel iorat ing 
frictions retarding restructuring negotiations.2 1 The U.S.  Treasury opposes the 
bankruptcy ini t iat ive. even as i t  agrees that the frictions need amelioration . In 
the Treasury 's view. the frictions stem from the terms of sovere ign bond 
contracts and so should be el iminated by rewrit ing the contracts rather than by 
imposing an international law mandate .
"2 The Treasury ' s  preference for the 
narro'vv reading of the pori POSSIl clause fol lows from the position that a broad 
leading wou ld add to the frictions.  
There is a gap i n  th is  discussion.  No one interrogates the poss ibi lity that 
the broad reading of the pari passlI clause invoked i n  Be lg ium holds out 
benefits for sovere ign bondholders as a group (and not just  for a handfu l  of 
vulture investors). Thi s  Article addresses the gap, situating the c lause  in the 
economic context of sovereign debt rel ationships. The Article shows that bond 
con tracts benefit bondholders i n  three ways when they create frictions that 
17 Ii/. 
I:; Sec ill/m te:\t dcco1l1panying notes 35-42. 
Ie) H.W. Urb,ln CiIVIBH I'. Republic of Argentina. 2003 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 23363 (SD.N.Y. Dec. 30. 
200]) 
:'i) Statelllelllllf Interest of the United States. Macrotccnic Int'l Corp. ". Republic of Argentina. 2004 U.S. 
DisL LLXIS 213() ISDN.Y Feb. 13. 200..J.). 
:' I . .... nlle Kruege:·. New Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking. 
SpecL'h cit the SOl creign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hil/ards Conference (Apr. I. 2(02). ol"llilahle (1/ http:// 
111111. i I11l.mg/e\ ternal/np!speechcsI2002/040 I 02 .htlll. 
2:' Under Secretary elf Treasury John B. Taylor. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective. 
Sp,;cch at the SLl\crcign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards Conference (Apr. 2. 20(2). omilah/e !II http:// 
111111'. i ie.cum/publ icatil)ns/papersitaylor0402.htlll. 
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retard sovere ign debt composi t ions .  First, the contracts d imin ish the l ikel ihood 
of defau l t  by opportunist ic sovereigns seeking to external ize the effects of 
economic  reverses. Second, assum i ng severe financial d i s tress, they make i t  
less  l ike ly  that  the defaul t ing sovere ign w i l l  attempt to i mpose the burden of 
restructuring on the p art icul ar c l ass of bonds.  Third, assum ing a restruc turing, 
they i mprove the bondholders ' bargain ing posit ion . More general l y, the pari 
passu c lause ,  read broadly ,  constrains the distressed sovereign ' s  range of 
choices,  enhanc ing the enforcement power of the bonds and arguably lowering 
the long-run cost of sovereign debt capital . 
This expl anat ion ju s tifies judic ial attachment  of the broad reading 'vvi thout, 
at the same time, dictati ng its attachment or rendering the narrow reading 
i mplaus ib le  or i l legi t imate . Accordingly ,  the exp lanation does not by virtue of 
its ow n existence determine the issue of contract in terpretation .  It instead 
h igh l ights the difficul ty of the case. No trade usage wi l l  emerge here to ease 
the burden on the i n terpreting court ,  for actors in the sovereign debt market 
di spute the c lause ' s  meaning in good faith .  The court accordingly w i l l  bear 
normat ive responsibi l i ty for the outcome .  By  way of providing contextual 
guidance, this Article i l l u minates the source of the problem. dep ict ing 
sovereign debt as a world of trade offs and contradictions. where a contract 
that makes the bondholders better off means one thing on the clay i t  is executed 
and de l ivered, and another thing in the event of severe dis tress l ater on. With 
private debt, such contradictions are surmounted through the delis e.\" llIacilil/o 
of a b ankmptcy regime .  With sovereign debt there is no bankruptcy, forc ing 
the parties to paper over the te nsions between ex ante and ex post by drafting 
vaguely .  I ntractable questions of interpretation arise in consequence. 
Part I describes the disruptive role the pari passli clause p lays in sovereign 
debt compos it ions, stating the case favoring the narrow reading. Part II 
reconsiders the economic incentives i n  play at the time lenders close loans to 
sovereigns ,  stat ing a case for the broad readi ng. Part III works the compet ing 
readings through the legal framewor k  of bond contract i nterpretat ion .  The 
exerc i se shows that the matter comes down to a choice between an ex ante 
read ing, conducted as of the time the contract is executed and de l i vered.  and an 
ex post readi ng, conducted as of the l ater t ime of distress. The Article 
concludes that the ex post read ing legit imately may be attached to the clause, 
not because it i s  correct at al l  times and in  al l contexts, but because th is is in 
fact a t ime of d istress. 
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I. UNANIMOUS ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, HOLDING OUT, PRIORIT Y, 
AND PAY M ENT 
This Part describes coordination problems and holdout incentives that 
retard the process of sovereign debt restructur in g. Because the broad readin g 
of the pari passu clause aggravates these problems, to describe the 
restructu ring process is to state a policy justification for a narrow reading. A 
practice-based case for a nan'ow reading supplements the policy argument. 
A. The Policy Case for a Narrow Interpretation 
With private debt, defaults l ead to enforcement against debtor property. 
Left unchecked, a seque nce of uncoordinated judgments, l evies, executions, 
and propel1y sales literally tears apart a d istressed prod ucing entity. Corporate 
bankruptcy reorganization prevents this, stay i n g  creditor enforcement actions 
and providing a safe space for a composition bargain that scales down the 
creditors' payment rights and returns the debtor to f iscal health. 
Sovereign debt works differently. Soverei g n  immu n ity limits opportunities 
for direct enforcement. Default accordingly leads to informal, often lengthy 
standstills i nstead of destructive "grab races." The creditors wait out the 
pe riod of distress, expecting eventual economic recovery to lead to a 
resumption of payments. Payment resumption often requ ires that the creditors 
come to the negotiati ng table to rewrite the defau lted debt contracts. Such a 
"composition," or "restructuring," scales down the sovereign ' s obligations. 
[n theory ,  this causes the sovereign to recover from fi nancial distress more 
qu ickly and should make both the sovereign and its creditors better off. 
Process barriers must be overcome in the conclusion of a composition. 
Some stem from information asymmetries, others from coordinat ion problems 
due to large n u mbers of creditors. Stili others stem from the bond contracts 
themselves. Boilerplate clauses, called "unanimous action clauses" (UACs), 
can cond ition amendment of the bond contract's key payment terms on 
u nanimous bondhol der consent. Historically, UACs govern sovereign bonds 
issued in New York. Sovereign bond contracts executed and delivered in 
London ,  in contrast, contain "collective action clauses" (CACs), vvhich permit 
across-the-board amendments with a three-qu arters majority. \Nhere as CACs 
facilitate restructuring of the defaulting sovereign's debt, UACs stand i n  the 
2004] PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN'S RATIONAL CHOICES 829 
way. Corporate debt also tends to contain UACs, but bankruptcy regImes 
trump the clauses with m andatory collective action.�3 
The feasibility of unanimous creditor consent to a composition depends on 
the numbers and the lending context. Historically, g roups of bank creditors, 
even l arge ones, have proved amenable to, if not eager for, such consent. The 
numbers are small and norms of cooperation are brought to bear against the 
unr u ly.2.J With thickly-traded, bonded debt and thousands of bondholders 
dispersed around the globe, unani mous action is impossible. At least one 
bondholde r  a lways will say no. An incentive to hold out arises from the very 
fact that the composition makes the bondho lders better off as a group. The 
opportunistic bondholder withholds its essential vote in hopes of procuring a 
side payment from the transaction's proponents. 
UACs do not present an absolute bar to the restructuring of widely 
dispersed debt, however. A composition can be effected by indirection. 
Instead of being asked to vote to amend their bond contracts, the bondholders 
are asked to exchange their bonds for s ubstitute bonds that contain modified 
terms more favorable  to the debtor. The proponent neither expects nor 
requests universal participation. Even so, the closing of the exchange o ffer 
will be conditioned on sllpermajority acceptance. Holdouts remain a probl em 
because a freeriding strategy remains avai l able to a bondhol der opportunist. 
Even if no side payment will be forthcoming, say ing no to an exchange offer 
means holding on to the original. unamended bond. Such a hold out retains the 
benefit of the debtor's original promise to pay and all other contract rights, 
even as the exchanging majority makes concessions i n  respect of the timing 
and amount of payments. If only a few creditors hold out, the exchange offer 
still succeeds. But if enough creditors succumb to temptation and join the 
ho ldouts, the exchange offer fails. More particularly, if the subsidy to the 
holdouts is  greater than the increase in value to the exchanging creditors, every 
one is better off re fusing to exchange.
" 
The failure of the offer makes 
everybody worse off. 
Bond issuers wield a weapon against ho ldouts in the form of an "exit 
consent" attached to the exchange offer. Under the New York drafting 
practice, the contract's payment terms are subject to UACs, while ancil l ary 
:C3 Bratton & Gulati. slIl'm note I I. 
2� Lee C. Buchheit & Ralph Reisner. The FJ/<'Cl r!/ 111(' S()\'{'J'('igli 0('/)1 !?e,\'II'/(CflIring {'mcess Oil IlIfer­
Credilor He/miollships. 1088 U.II.I . L. Rr:v, '+93. 507-10. 
:CS Mark J, Roc. Flie VOlillg Pmliii>iliol! iii BOlld \VorkoIIfS. 1.)7 YALE L.J. 232.236 ( 1 987). 
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protective promises and process terms are subject to CACs. An e xit consent is 
a proposal to remove these protective provisions by a majority vote 
amendment u nder the CAC made simultaneously with an e xchange offer. The 
cooperative, exch anging bondholders approve the amendmen t  even as the y  
exit. This leaves the holdouts with their original principal and interest terms 
intact but subject to manipulative action by the debtor. For e xample, a 
sovereign bond' s negative pledge clause, which protects against the creation of 
security interests in other issues of debt, can be removed by means of exit 
consents. As drafted historically ,  sovereign debt contracts also leave their pari 
passu clauses vulnerable to removal by exit consent.�6 As protective provisions 
disappear, the likelihood that the holdouts ever receive their unamended 
principal and interest payments diminishes.27 
Indeed, starvation by continued nonpaymen t  is the sovereign debtor' s tactic 
of last resort against holdouts-at least as long as the pari passll clause is read 
narrowly. S overeign compositions work very differently from their corporate 
cou n terparts at this point  in the scenario. Corporate restructuring ou tside of 
bankruptcy occurs on a preemptive basis, prior to default. The holdout  takes a 
free r ide if the e xchange offe r  succeeds: It is "buoyed up,"  retaining a bond 
paying one hundred cen ts on the dollar even as it joins the creditors who 
exchanged for scaled-down payments in benefiting from the avoidance of 
bankruptcy and the debtor ' s  rehabil itation. If the corporate debtor wishes to 
stay out of bankruptcy after the composit ion cl oses, it will h ave to stay current 
on payments to the h oldout  as well as to all  other creditors. In the sovereign 
context the stakes ratchet up on both side s .  Many sovereign restructur ings 
occur after a payment default. Because composition means the e xchange of 
old paper for new ,  it does not cure the defaul t  on the old paper. As with Elliott 
and its Peru vian debt, the ho l dout retains the power to both accelerate its own 
debt and claim the entire principal amount to be due presently. The holdout 
2(, The standard UAC langu :lgc hroad ly covcrs thc bondholders" r ight  to  payment. and accord i ngly could 
bc re,ld to cover the I)(//"i 1J{ISSIf c lause . Sec. e.g. , Prospectus Suppleme n t  to Prospecl l ls . Government of 
J amaica.  1 0 .('�5r;( otes Due 20 1 7. at (,2-(,3 (June -1. 2002) .  H ere the contract contains a UAC i ncluci i n g  
alllcndments thm wo uld " reduce a n y  amounts payable" o r  ch ange t h e  "ohl igati()n t o  pay a n y  add i t i o n al 
amounts . "  Arguably, phrases l i ke these refer to mon ey clue and o w i n g  under the note,  r ights that would not  bc 
arfected by l i ft ing of the 1)([l"i I}(ISSII clausc. B u t  the lllatter is not h'ee rrom doubt.  Drafters o r  exchange ofrers 
avoid the issue by h a v i ng the e x i t  consent lllodify the bond contr,lu ' s  sovereign i m mu n i ty wai ver so as to 
e ,\c l ude attachmcnt or amounts p a i d  lInder the composi t i o n .  Sec Pmspecllls S upplement to Pmspec tus .  
Repu b l i c'a Oriental del Uruguay. OtTer \0 Exchange. at S--I ( Apr. 1 0 , 2(03 ) I he re i n aftcr Uruguay Exchange 
OtTer I .  iII '{/iIIlMe III http ://www. bcu.gub. uy/autoriza/sgoioiireperfi l amienLO/prospectosup,pd f. 
27 On the use of e x i t  consents to engineer a sovere ign restructuring.  sec Lee C. Buchheit  & G . M i t u  
Gu i ati , Elil COlisel i ls ill SOl'ereigll HOlld CI( "//{/lIge.l , -IS UCLA L. R iC \', 59 ( 2000 ) .  
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thus is buoyed up much higher with respect to the restructured debt than i s  the 
holdout in the corporate case.2X B ut the sovereign debtor has an option 
unavailable to the corporate debtor : It can get away with leaving the holdout to 
starve as long as two condit ions obtain .  First, the holdout must have no v iable 
route to enforcement of i ts c laims, a route held out by the broad reading of the 
pari passll c lause attached in Be lg ium.  Second, the existence of unpaid 
holdout debt must not destab i l i ze the rehabi l itated sovereign ' s  rel at ions with 
the credit markets .2'! 
I f  pari passl l  c lauses support actions by holders of defaulted sovereign 
bonds to block payments to other sovere ign credi tors, then sovereign holdouts 
occupy much the same bargaining position as their corporate counterparts . 'o If 
pari passll c lauses do not prohibit payments to favored creditors by sovereigns 
in defaul t, the potential  holdout ' s calcu lations are materia l ly al tered. As long 
as the value on offer i n  the composit ion is greater than the market value of the 
bond, even a vul ture fund might fi nd participation advantageous .  Such a 
vu l ture ,  much l i ke E l l iott w i th its Peru v ian bank debt, w i l l  have purchased i ts 
bonds at a deep di scount i n  the secondary market after the onset of distress and 
2S The stamtml cmporate trus t indenture i n h i b i ts the holdout  ill all add i t ional respect .  Ind iv idual hol ders 
Illay bring u n i l ateral enforcement actions only in respect of m i ssed payments of pr inc ipal  and i lllerest :  they 
Illay not u n i l atcral ly accelerate the i r  o w n  bonds . See REVISED iVjO[)EL S I \ Ii'Li HED l ;-; llE"n RF �� 6 02. 0' (')7 
( 2000 ). reprilllei/ ill 55 B tS LAw. I I 1 5  ( 2000 ) .  For the su ggest ion that sovc:re ign  bonds should be redrafted 
to fo l low the corporate pattern and rcmove the uni lateral accci el'ation right.  sec J i l l  E. Fi sch & Caro l i n e  M. 
Gent i l e .  VII/Illres or VOlIgllor£!.1 1: Tlte Ro/I' oj Liligoli()l1 ill SO l'f:'reigll /)('/)I RI'.llrtlClill illg. 53 E\iORY L.J. 
1 047. 1 076-77 (2004 ) 
2') Th i s  point  fol l o ws from th e  reputat ion theory of SO\TI·c ign ciebt. See ill/i'u text  accompany i ng note -+-+. 
I t  does not  fol lo\\' that  restruciuring COIHracts can forbi d  the soverl' ign from m ak ing payments to holdout;;. 
Such a term might open the benefited holelers to all act ion for inciucement of breach of con tract. Sel' Ke ith 
C l ark. SOl 'neigll /)I!/JI ReSlrtlc/lirillgs: Parill' or Trl'lI/lIlelll Bell\ '1'1!1I Eijllil '{l/I'III CredilOrs ill Re/ulio/i 10 
CO/ll/)(lr(I!Jie /)"/)[.1 . 20 1 ;\ ( 1 .  L.\\\' 85 7 , 863 ( 1 986 ) ;  cf Fi rst 'vVyo.  Flank.  Casper v. lvludge. 748 F.2d 7 1 3  ( 1 0th 
e i L  1 (8 8 )  (ho ld ing a bank knowingly tak ing secLiri ty in v iolation of a l1egat i n� pl edge l iable for tortious 
i ntelfe rence ) . Due to this fear o r  tort l i ab i l i ty .  con tracts i n  bank restructuri ngs only go so far as to prov ide lhat 
if  the debtor pays nonpart ic ipating debt ahe ad of schedule .  i t  w i l l  pay the resched u l ed debt pro rata . SI'I' Ph i l i p 
R. Wood, Pari Passu C/IIII.II'.\ - W//(/l ()o ihl!\' i\o1(,OIl :) 1 8  B I  .. TTERWORTHS J. I;-;T ' L  13 A :\ K i V, & FI:\. L 37 1 ,  
3 n  (2003 ) .  
Ole that t h e  /hl l i  IJ(lSSIi clause.  under t h e  broad read ing.  induces n o  defaul ts: i t  ins tead prevents 
selcct in� comp l i ance w i th other ob l igat ions assu m i ng defau l t  on the debt the c lall ';e CO\ (TS. A c l au se drafted 
in the negat i ve- i n w h i c h  the borrom':r co\·enanted not to make any payments to other credi tors-\\ uu ld  he 
Illore probl emati c .  S('I' Clark. SIIJlUl. at  863. 
10 Th is  i s  assumi ng . of course. that  the holdout can find no other  assets of the suvereign agai n , t  which to 
l evy execut ion . 
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wi l l  be looking for spectacular short-term returns. 1 1 Without an easy route to 
payment in fu l l ,  the compos ition itself becomes the source of the quick profit. 
The outcome of the i nterpretation of the pa ri passu cl ause has paral ie l  
i mpl ications for the debate over a sovereign bankruptcy regime.  The  IMP' s 
proposed bankruptcy architecture would trump UACs and fac i l i tate 
restructur ing  i n  a m ajority action framework. The U .S .  Treasury agrees on the 
need for majority action even as i t  rejects bankruptcy, due to a preference for 
market solutions over regulatory intervention. 32 B ecause UACs l i e  at the core 
of the process problem and UACs are contract terms, the Treasury i s  
encouraging the parties to sovere ign bond contracts to  rewrite the terms i nstead 
of supporting an international mandate overriding the tenns. In the Treasury ' s  
view, CACs are superior to UACs from a n  effic iency point o f  view, w ith 
UACs benefit ing only opportun ists who hold up rational creditors atte mpting 
to enhance value .  I t  fol l ows, says the Treasury ,3
1 
that sovereign bondholders 
w i l l  freely exchange their ex isting UAC bonds for CAC bonds, amel iorating 
the coordination problems.  A l l  one need do is make a publ i c  offer of the new 
CAC bonds and l et the market price them .  The price wil l at al l events exceed 
that of the UAC bonds, inducing across-the-board exchanges by the tens of 
b i l l ions of face amount.
\-) 
The Treasury ' s  intervention has not triggered across-the-board e xchange 
o ffers el iminating UACs from the exist ing sovereign debt stock, even as 
notable progress has been made in the inc lusion of CACs in new financ ings i n  
New York. Meanwhi le ,  the Treasury ' s  opposit ion sta l led the I M F ' s  
bankruptcy in it iative .
" 
The ho ldout problem remai ns on the table as a result .  
A pol icy s igna l  for the interpret ing judge resu lts : Because the broad reading of 
pori passu magnifies i ncentives to hold out where the narrow reading 
d im in ishes them,  the narrow reading should attach. S ign ificantly, the pol icy 
considerations that point to the narrow interpretation also motivate both the 
IMF bankruptcy in iti ative and the Treasury ' s  vis ionary exchange offer .  
3 1 John C Co ffee, J r .  &. W i l l i am A .  K l ei n ,  BOlld/wlelel C(}('I'cioll :  The Prahlelll ot' COllslmilled Clioice in 
IJeiJl Tender 0lle l.l ({lid ReC{{l)if({!i�OIi()n.\. 5S U. CH l . L. REV.  1 207 . 1 2 1 4  ( 1 99 1  ) . 
.12 Sec B arry Eichengreen, F i n ancia l  Crises and W h a t  10 Do About Them, ch.  I ( 200 1 )  ( u llp u b l i shed 
manuscript, un ti le w i th author ) :  Tay l o r. II/I'm note 22 .  
3 3  See Tay lor,  .II/I)m nOle 22 . 
.14 Adam Lerrick & A l l an H .  iYk luer, Sm'clcigll !Je/c/IIII: Thc j'lil '{lle SeclOl C(//I Res()I\ '(! Bunkn/JiICl' 
Wirholll (/ FOl'llwl COIIII (Carnegie M e l l on. C a i l l ol Cenler for Pu b l i c  Po l i cy ,  Quarterly I n t ' l  Econ. Report, ,tl,pr. 
2(02 ) .  amilliNe at hllp://elllcredilors.Colll/pclfln ) EC'k 20S0V',{ 2 0 13 �lIlkruptcyr!c 20Study .pdf. 
35 B ratton & Gulat i  . .  I I //'m nute I I .  
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Propone nts of the broad readi ng are left looking l i ke greedy speculators, 
schemi ng and wheedl ing beyond the pale of legit i mate just ificatory pol i c y .  
B. The Practice Case Io r  a Na rro w Intelpreta tioll 
When a borrower is u nable to pay al l  of its debts as they come due, at least 
o ne of its c reditors (an d  l ikely  more than one if  i t  has many creditors) w i l l  
receive less than the b orrower' s  pro m ised performance. The broad reading of 
the pari passLl c lause is  addressed to this  s i tuatio n ,  accord i n g  p rotect i on when 
o ne or more, but not necessar i ly  al l ,  creditors w i l l  be receiv i ng less than is  due 
and owi ng .  U nder the broad reading,  the borrower in default  undertakes to pay 
its foreign obl igat ions pro rata to the extent i t  makes payments at a l l  w he n  i n  
defau l t .  The pari passu c lause, thus read, means pro rata payment t o  a l l  s o  that 
no cred itor receives a de facto preference or priority. 3& 
The n arrow readi n g , in contrast, is less purpos ive and more textual . Return 
now to the po ri POSSlI c l ause in Peru ' s  defau lted guaran ty,  which stated that 
. .  [ t Jhe obiigat ions of the Gu arantor here u nder do rank and w i l l  rank at least 
pori PClSSli  in pr iori ty of paymen�
_ 
w ith al l  other External I n debtedness of the 
Guarantor. and interest thereon .  , . ' ,  N ote that the c l ause never q u i te says "t he 
G u arantor shzd !  pay . "  I n stead it m akes a representat ion and a promise about 
" prior i ty  of paymen t . "  M uch h angs on the d i st i nct ion . Th e narrow read i ng ' s  
proponents assert that the c l ause i ntel l ig i b l y  c a n  b e  re ad t o  cover 
" priorit ies" -rights to payment a s  against other credi tors in co ntract and in 
l aw-as opposed to the payments th emselves .  
The case for the narrow reading fo l lo ws from h istory . The proponents start 
their  h i storical  story a century and a half ago and lay out a succession o f  
narrow functions served b y  the clause i n  d iffere nt tran sact ional  contexts .  No 
add i t iona l content. they asselt, should be added. 
The story h as four phases.  It starts with V ictor ian rai l road bonds. The 
defau lt ru le  u nder B r i t i sh l aw in those days created priori t ies  in  c o i l ateral under 
a c om mon mortgage i n  accordance w ith the time o f  debt i s s ue or the t ime of 
debt n,aturity, 'S This first- i n -t ime regime did not sui t  the p u rposes o f  bond 
i s suers and holders u n der open-ended mortgages, who wanted al l holders of all 
3(l \rVuud . s!tIJJ'(! note 29. at 37'2.  
-" Lll\\cll fe ld  Declarat ioll . Sl ip/'({ note: I. '11 9 .  
, ,", Lee C .  B U�' hheit & Jerclniah S .  Pain. JJtc Pari Pa;-;sl I  CllI lI :.:e ill ,)'o \'ereign [)ehr IIlSfUUJlell/S. 53 E!\'IORY 
L.J. Xl,(). X'i:i ( 200·+1. 
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bo nds benefi ted by the l i en to h ave equal rights . Accordingly ,  the mortgages 
provided that a foreclosing creditor acted for the benefit of a l l  holders at the 
• .  • 3<) 
same pnonty,  jJO l'l jJossu.  
I n  the story ' s  second phase, the pori POSSll clause shows up in sovere i gn 
bonds i n  the early twentieth century. Sovereign borrowers i n  those days often 
" earmarked"  c ertain assets or cash flows, attaching the payment streams to 
stated debt issues w i thout formall y  conceding l iens.  These quasi-security 
i nterests imp l ied de facto priorities i n  the subj ect assets. The pract ical  value of 
the de facto c o m m itments was questionab le ,  of course . Even so,  other lenders 
obj ected to the pract ice .  Pori possu clauses appeared in unsecured sovereign 
debt contracts to forbi d  e armarki ng ,  performing the same function served by 
. I d I 
. . d -lll negati v e  p e ge c auses 1 11 Iss ues to ay. 
In the story ' s  third phase, we move forward i n  time to cross-border b an k  
l e n d i n g:  to c orporat ions i n  the post-war era. Pori IHISSU clauses are i n c l u ded i n  
these contracts to amel iorate legal risks he ld  out by nat ional  i ns o l vency 
reg i mes .  In  cross-border lending, nothing guarantees that  the borro w er ' s  
nationa l  b an kruptcy l aw operates, l i ke that o f  the United S tates and the United 
K ingdom. to condit ion a clai m ' s  subordination on the c lai mant ' s  consent. -I I  
The j ) { !  r i  ()(ISSII c lause is  thought to tru mp unconsented subord ination by 
operat ion of n ationa l l aw. -l 2  
Nmv to the final phase of the story , i n  wh ich the pori POSSLf c l ause appears 
I n  co ntemporary sovereign bank loan and bond documentat ion,  once agam 1 0  
;" III. �Il S<) -l)(, .  
� l '  !J at SW)-LJ7, <) 1 2- I .l :  .ICC (//.10 2 PI l IL iP  W OOD, L.'\ W .\1\D PrnCTIC[ or '  INTERJ\,\T IO'- i.,\'- FINANCE 
� (LC! 3 !  J I ( I ')SO ) :  \V i l l ia ll1 Tudor John, SOI'(!,l'igll Risk ({lid !1!/llIullin' Under Elig/i.1/1 L(/ \\ '  ([lid Pmuice, ill I 
L< i i f{ ': \ll (  1\ \ 1 .  Fi .\ .' .'\C I . \ I .  L\ \\ 7 1 . 95-96 ( R ohert S. Rende l l ed" 2d eel. 1 9 8 3 ) .  
-i l  I t  1'0 1 1 0 \\ ,  o n  t h i s  p�acl ing that U . s .  domest ic  corporate debt req uires n o  I)([ri pllSSU cl ause because the 
" ,tcln eI()e, not ,, 1 1011' ror i n l'(ll u n t ary subordinat ion . B U L'hhei t & Pam. IlIllm note 38. at 873 -74. Th is  is  r ight 
5(1 rar as It goes Tu go a step farther, shift to the broad reading and ask why domestic corporate bonds do not 
req u i re /!uri /)({.I .III payments. The anSll C l' i s  that prior to default .  payments are assumed to be unequal because 
d i l ere l lt debt i " .,ucs havc di fferent paYlllent selleduks. A fter d e faul t .  one of tWll Ih ings h appcns.  If the debtor 
goes i n to hank:'ul'tL'Y, the bankruptcy system loose l y i mposes equal i ty and recap tu res a l i m i ted class of 
prcferen t i �tI pavlnents .  Sec I i U Sc .  � I I 29(b )( I )  (WOO ) ( containing a proh ib i t io n o f  d i scr iminat ion i n  
hankruptcy rcurgan i l'a t io n p l a n s ) .  I f  t h e  debtor cloes n o t  g o  i n to bankruptcy proceedings,  a reg i me o f  credi tor 
cl i i igencL' prel', , ; l s. �lIlci the L reci irurs I'ace tll the Cllu l t house under a regi llle of first - i n - t i me priority.  Because the 
bankrupt'-'\' a l ternati n? l'an be p�s()rted 111 by a creditor concerned Ihat the c n foreemen t act ions  o f  others w i l l  
lead t o  a n  u l h:qual res u l t. sce iii. .� .103 I prUl iding fur im o lun tary bankruptcy pet i t ions tikd b y  creditor s ) ,  no 
c '- ' ll lraClu�t I  I 'II Ii !iWSIl pro\' i s i (ln is  n L'l'C"ar\'. The S\'stelll does tol erate prefe rent ia l  paYll lents  by debtors in 
d i stress priur to ban krup tcy .  subject to Bankruptcy Codc § 547 . SCI' iii. � 547; Debra J. Schnehel . /lllercreditor 
ulld SII/>orriillllfi(lil , \ gI'CI'1I1L'J lI.I-A i'mcli({// GlIide. 1 1 8 B .-'.,\ K I '-:C; L J .  48. 49 ( 200 I ) . 
I' B I IL'hhc i !  & Pam. slI/m/ note 3 1\ ,  al 8 7 � :  see u/so B u c h h e i t  & Reisner. SII/ )ro note 2-[. at 4<) 7 .  
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order to b l oc k  involuntary subordi n ation.  The need for the block i nten sifies .  
given a sovereign b orrower. Hypothesize a national government w i s h i ng to 
repudi ate a predecessor government ' s  debt obl i gatio n s .  It orchestrates a 
legis lative intervention u nder which the inconvenient debt is su bordinated by 
law to all  of its other o b ligations .  The g overnment then claims that positive 
l aw prevents payment, tying its hands. The pari passu c l ause s upposedly 
assures that a positive l aw payment restraint,  whatever i ts et iology, i s  not a 
defense to an action on the c ontract.·n For a more mu ndane example of a 
subordination risk u nder national law, cons ider a mocedure held out bv the 
1 J 
laws of S pain,  the P h i lippines, and other Spanish-speaking countr ies .  A 
creditor and a debtor can join  together formal ly  to reg i ster the ir  debt con tract. 
pay i n g  a fee .  The rew ard is a j u rid ical  priority over other unsecured creditors. 
In the pari passu c lause, the sovereign debtor promises not to partic ipate i n  this 
ri tual . It also wan'ants against the presence of a lega l priority ladder app lying 
to u nsecured debt. ·I-I 
This four-part story neatly explains the narrow read i ng of pori jJUSS I i .  We 
see,  say the proponents,  why the c l ause is so opaque:  The vague draft i ng 
fol lows from the fact that over t ime the c l ause has come to cover m u l t i ple 
bl 
. 1 '  
pro e m s . ' 
C. SUI/ I I /WI"\' 
The hi storical s tory leaves open some questions:  Even if a l l  of the 
foregoing is  true,  what prevents the opaq uely drafted c la u se fro m cover ing 
preferen t i a l payments as  wel l?  Does the n arrow read i n g  of necess i ty lii l / i t  the 
c l au se ' s  re ach to the concerns i dentified-pri ority i n  law and the lapsed 
practice of ear m arking of revenues-so as to require exc lus ion of preferent ial 
payments') Noth i ng i n  the h i storical account i mpl ies  such a l i m i t .  The l i mi t  
comes from the contemporary pol icy context  i n  which the  broad re ading 
stre ngthens the h ands of holdouts and d iscourages com pos i t ions .  
The narrow reading thus  commends i tsel f not because of the h i story but  
because the sovere ign debt m arkets have stumbled into c r i s i s . G i ve n  the cris is .  
i f  a l l  other things are equ al,  the n arTOW read ing shou ld be pre fe rred because i t  
-I �  The ploy is not a defense to enforcement act ions i n  the U n i ted States. SCi' Li br;t Bal ik Ltd. I' . Rancll 
N ac i ona l de Costa R ica, S . A . ,  570 F. Supp. 870 ( S . D. N . Y .  1 9 S:1 ) : A l l i ed Bank I n t ' l  I .  Banct) Cred it" At'i'icola 
de: Cartago, 566 F. S tipp.  1 -1-10 ( S D.N.Y.  1 9 8 :1 ) ,  ret '" 757 F �d 5 1 6 ( 2 d C i L ) .  1 '( ' / "1. dis/lI/ssec/ . .+7."\ u.s <)3'+ 
( 1 <) 8 5 ) .  For further d i scussion, sec B uchheit  & Pan), slIlm/ note 38. at l) 1 3 - 1 '+. 
·j·1 B uchhei t  & Pam. SlIj)/"{/ note 38. at 903-0 :; :  Wond, .l l Ij)J"(I note �l). at 37 1 - T! . . 
-L') B uchheit  & P�1111. Sf{IJro note 3 8 .  at 9 1 2  
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makes restructuring easier to accomp l i sh by makin g  holding out less attractive.  
The question is whether al l other things are in fact equal . Part I I  shows that 
they are not.  I t  states a case for " priority of payment" to cover p ay ments as 
w e l l  as contractual or posit ive l aw priori ties even i n  the context of sovereign 
distress .  The choice between the two read ings enta i l s  a tradeoff between two 
rational but inconsisten t  approaches to the prob l e m  pre s ented by d i stre s s .  
I I .  PARI PASSU AND SOVEREIGN C HO[CES : DEFAULT AND PR [ORfTY 
D is tressed debtors tend to be concei ved as actors without choices.  I n  th is  
p icture, defaul t s  occur because resources are exhausted, not  because the 
debtors act  s trategical l y ;  if resources are exhausted no credi tor gets paid .  The 
real i ty is more compl icated.  Some times debtors have a choice as to w hether t o  
defau l t .  O n c e  i n  defaul t ,  debtors m a y  have resources avai l ab l e  t o  pay some but  
not  a l l  of the i r creditors, making i t  poss ible  to  choose favorites . The pari 
passl l  c lau se, u n de r  the broad readi ng, addresses these choices toward the end 
of reducing the sovereign bOlTower' s zone of d iscretio n .  By maki ng 
compo s i tions harder to conc lude, the c lause makes default  a less  attractive 
c ho ice and hence less l i ke l y  to occur.  B y  m aking prefere n ti a l  payments 
v u lnerable to chal l enge, the c lause makes i t  less  l ikely that the bonds i t  protects 
w i l l  bear a d i sproport ionate share of the costs of d istress .  
Section A di scusses the pa ri passl I  c l au se ' s  bearing on debtor i ncentives to 
default ,  apply i n g  microeconomic e x p l anations of sovere ign debt.  Sec t io n B 
discusses the c lau s e ' s bearing on the default ing sovereign ' s  choices concerning 
restructur i n g  and prior i ty . 
A .  The Choice to Dejcl lllr 
The econom ics of sovereign debt b u i l d  on the fo l lowing aXIom:  U n less 
defaul t  i mposes some cost  on the debtor, not only w i ll the deb tor not pay the 
debt. t he lender w i ll not make the loan in the first place."(' Sovere ign le nding 
pres upposes that defaul t  has a cost.  The lower that cost, the smal ler  the 
sovere ign ' s  borrowing capac i t y ;  the greater the cost, the more w i l l i n g  the 
lenders are . 
�h Gabrielle Lipworth & Jens NystccJr, Crisis /?esollllioll IIlld Prim/!' Sec/or Adlll'/miol l ,  47 I 1vl F ST.VT 
PM'ERS 1 3 S .  1 92 .  1 95 ( 200 I ) .  ({milllhie III http://\\·w\\ . I I l 1r.nrg/E, ternal/pu bs/FT/swl'fp/2000/00-110Iln.pd r. 
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The threshold prob l e m  for the economics of sovere i g n  debt is to identify 
the cost that satisfies the ax iom.  The problem admits  of no easy solut io n  
because soverei g n  credi tors lack conve n t io n al means o f  enforcement by lev y  
a n d  execut ion against  debtor property . T h e  exerc i se of working through the 
debate isolates aspects of sovere i gn debt rel at ionships that make credible the 
broad readi ng of the pari passlf clause .  
1 .  Repufcttioll in  the Credit Markets 
U nder one school of thought, the cost of sovere ign default l ies  i n  exc l usi on  
fro m  future borrowi ng .  The lead i ng model as sumes that national economi e s  
are cycl ical  a n d  that people  prefer t o  consume evenly across the cycles .  Gi ven 
t h i s ,  i t  makes sense  for the  s tate to borrmv on the  downward cycle t o  fund 
consumption and l ater to repay the loans w ith returns generated on the upward 
cycle.  The default ing sovereign converts to i tself a gain from trade-the 
extemporal cons u mption trade across the b u s iness cycle .  In the mode l .  the 
defaul t  tri ggers a lender embargo. The debtor ends the embargo by 
transferr ing the converted surp lus  to the  lenders, its r ightfu l owners.�7 The cost  
of  defau lt  to  the sovere ign is  the cost  of being shut  out o f  the  credi t  markets on 
the upward cycle and assoc iated con su mption constraints on the ne x t  
down ward cycle.�x Access to the c redi t  markets being the key,  this  i s  terme d  
t h e  " reputational " mode l o f  sovereign debt. 
On first inspecti o n ,  this descri ption supports the narrow read i ng of the pari 
passu clause .  If  a h i gh-powered int erest i n c red i t  market access determ ines t he 
sovere i gn ' s  behav ior, then the sovereign \", i l l  o n l y  defau lt  in the event of an 
u nanticipared shortage of reso urces due to an external shock or other 
�7 As long as the transfer i s  made. the  cred i t  llloraLOriu lll can he a shon Olle .  See Ken neth M, Klet7.cr & 
8 ri an D ,  Wright.  S(J\'ereigli De"r (/.1' II/rerrell/pow/ BlIrrer. 90 A�t.  ECOi'O, REV, 62 1 ( 2000 ) ,  The credi t  in tl ows 
to Lat i n Aillerica i n  thc earl y 1 990s in the \\'ake o f  B rady I-estruc turi ngs provide a good e.\ampl e  or this ,  See 
Ch arles  W, Calomiris ,  How tll Resol ve the Arge n t i ne Sovereign Debt Cris is  t AE I  Papers & S tud ies. Ap r, 1 6 .  
200 I ) , ( / I 'l l i/oh/c {If ht tp : //www .aei .org/ inc l  ude/puh_pri nl .asp" p u b l  D =  1 -+869, 
·I� In t h i s  pi ct ure . the oil ly statc th at repud i a tes its debt i s  the statc t h a t  ncver plans  to bOITOW aga i n _  
Lipwonh & Nystedl. .l'ujim note 4 7 .  a t  I 89-<JO, M or e  el aborate art iculat ions o f  (h is  repu tat ion a l model ope n lip 
(he cl ass of defa u l t s  to d i st inguish  betwee n strategic anci d i stress s i tu at ions and ex pand the l enders ' bcha vior 
pattern to al low for the poss i b i l i ty of forg i \'cncss , Sc(' Harold L. Cole e t a l . .  /)cfilltir. SCII/nlll'lIf, {(!Ill 
Signo/ling:  Lent/ing Re,lllIlljiri()!I ill {/ NC/lurali()lIa/ M()de/ ()r SOI'(,I'l'igll De",. :16 INT' L Eco� , Rrov, J65 ( 1 995 i 
( (iel'c lopi ng a model of ho I\' defa u l t i ng sovere i g n s  l ose access to credi t  marKets and \Vork to regain access ) :  see 
n/,I() Mi ch ael R, Tom/:. SovCI'ei gn Debt and I n tern ational Cooperat i on: R eputat io na l Reasons for Lcnding anci 
Repayment  ( Oct . 200 I )  ( unpuhl ished manuscr i pt . on fik w i t h  au thor) (describ i ng how sov!�rcign lenders \'.;ho 
de fau l t can re-enter rhe l end ing markets by incu rri n g  the h i gh-cost signal  of re pay ing their  earlier d ebts �lnd 
shOl\'ing the m se l v es no longer io he " lemol l s " ) ,  
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misfortu ne.  The l iquidity crises suffered b y  several emerging m arket debtors 
in the 1 990s provide a good example of such severe distress :  Nonresidents 
suddenly p u l l  out their c ap i tal and res i dent c ap ital responds by t1eeing to other 
j ur i sdict ions ; liquidity quickly disap pears and the economy i s  l iterall y  unable 
to meet external obligations.49 S overeigns defaulting in such situations have n o  
choice in t h e  matter. I t  follows that contract terms play no rol e  i n  d iscouraging 
these defau lts .  A t  the same time, once the l iquidi ty crisi s eases,  the defau lting 
sovereign has every i ncentive to present a plan of composition that returns i t  to 
the good graces of the credit  markets . This i s  the point i n  the descri p tion when 
contract terms become pertinent:  If a term creates a frict ion that retards the 
negotiation process,  i t  arguabl y  fail s  cost-benefit  i nspectio n .  Doubts ari se with 
respect t o  both UACs and the broad reading of the pori passLl clause .  
The p icture changes if we modify the assumption concerning the intens i ty 
of the sovere i g n ' s desire to maintain its reputat ion in the credit  markets .  In this  
modified p ictur e ,  the sovere i gn remains c on cerned about i ts  reputat ion b u t  c an 
be i nflu e nced by competing concern s .  Hypothes ize that the sovereig n ' s  
economy lapses into d istress s lowly .  A t  s o me point the question ari ses a s  to 
whether the economy can sustain the debt l oad out of its own resourc es .  A 
good faith dec is ion as to medium- or l on g-term u nsustainab i l ity can be made, 
ev en though the sovereig n ' s  foreign exchange reserves remain s u fficient to 
m e et ne<lr-term payments.
") 
In this  scenario,  default comes to make sense as a n  
act  of  pol i t ical  w i l l :  Actors i n  t h e  national government ( a long with their 
dome s t i c  pol it ical opponents) decide that the tax burden and adm i ni s trat ive 
costs  of conti nue d  debt serv ice are intolerabl e  and that  the burden of payment 
( po l it ical  as wel l  as  economic)  outweighs the costs of defau lt . 5 1  
I f  we re J ax the i ntens ity of the sovereign ' s  desire t o  maintain its reputation 
one step more, a strategic default  becomes possible . " Th is  is an opportun istic 
breach stemm i ng from the debtor' s desire to siphon off the payment flow on 
the loan for another ·purpose.  Because debt payments reduce c urrent income,  
I') Punan Chuh�Lln & Fcder ico StLlrzenegger, De fau l t  Epi sodcs i l l  t h e  1 990s What Have We Learned ' )  5 
(J u l  Y 2 5 .  200-' ) ( u npubl  ishcd m:llluscri p t ) .  {/ \ '(/ii{/hie ({{ http ://WWW.Ulci l . cdu/deparlamc nlos/cmprcsaria iic i tl 
pdfs-\\·p/wpc i f- 1 1 20m . p d f  
:i l l  It!. 
') 1 . I()Il�lthan Eatoll.  Dehl Relicr lllld [/,1' III[erlW[iolio/ EII/(!i'CI'melli or l.Ollll COli lUi c!.\. J .  ECOi'.. PLRSP . .  
W i n l,:r I 99(). a l  -\ 3 .  -18--19. For c\; lIn p l c .  only onc of the nations i n  default  i l )  thc Lal in  American ciebt cri s i s  o f  
lhe 1 9S0s.  Chi \':. o Il ed a s  lTIuch a s  o n e  year · s  gross national pmcluct. See Jeremy G u l o w  & Kennelh Rogoff. , \  
CI'/l.\ 1lI1 1 1  R['WI/IUlI'lilig iv/ode! II/,Sm'ercigll Deh[. 9 7  1 .  POL. Eco:". 1 5 5 .  1 5 6 ( 1 98 9 l .  
:i c  Lip-.l onh & Nvstcdt. SlIj)/{/ n OlC -\7 . a t  1 95 .  
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default is welfare-improving as long as consequences in the credit  markets 
c arry little weight in  the cost-benefit anal y s i s .  
In b oth of these scenarios-a good-faith d istress default  resulting from 
p o l itical and economic calc u l ation and a strategic defaul t-the s overeign 
makes choices.  It fol lows that the debt contracts can p lay a role in influencing 
the sovereign' s choices,  a t  least  as  long as the sovereign retai n s  an i nterest i n  a 
future return to the credit  markets . Pari passll c l auses (under the broad 
reading),  along with UACs,  m ake the composit ion process mor e  costly ,  adding 
to the costs of defau lt .  In so doing,  they delay d is tress defaults and discourage 
strategic defaults . 5
; 
Because they make defau lt less l i kely ,  they benefit the 
sovereign by i ncreasi n g  i ts  debt c ap ac i ty .  In addi tion, the sovereign that 
commits to h i gh restructuring costs at the negotiat ing table s ignal s i ts status as 
a good credit, lowering the cost o f  bOlTowi n g .
5-l 
--._ '-- L 
A n  efficiency question arises at this  p o i n t  i n  the analys is .  Costs o f  default 
couid be too high (greater debtor welfare loss than needed for the given 
measure of creditor protecti o n )  or too l o w  (de fault cost i n suffic ient to i mport 
an i ncentive to perform ) .  Professors Bolton and S keel  here i nterve ne to argue 
that sovereigns h ave perverse incentives to commit to excess ive ly  costly 
defaults . Information asymmetry s u p p lies one exp l anation for this-the 
sovereign th at com m i ts to h igb restructuri ng c osts s ignals its confi dence in its 
abi l ity to pay . Anot her re ason is  poli tical-a g i ven government may borrow 
heavily to sat i s fy short term objecti v e s .  Contrac t forms that m ake defau lt 
expe ns ive e xpand the government' s borrow ing capacity  and so suit the 
p u rposes of these short-s ighted pol i t ical  actors . The actors , however, 
underwe igh the l ong-run costs of the contract terms because the costs are 
i ncurred after their terms of office.  
The pori passl l  clJuse may or m ay not be economical ly  e ffic ient  u nder the 
broad reading .  B olton and S keel ' s  analysis  s uggests that it is  not . " B u t  the 
:; .
) 
ContTi..lri \v i sc .  i f  a decreaSe in the cost or  defau l t  i s  \vc l farc 111ax i rn iz ing, defau l t  is too expens i ve . ld. at 
I LJLJ. 
5-l B o l ton & Skee l .  .I'llI'm !lotc I - L �!I 77 1 .  B ol ton and Skeel arg uc that the i ncentive prob l e m  would be 
corrcctcd by a reg i me of first- i n-t ime priori t y .  Under t h is ,  the sovere ign 's  bOIT()\\' i n g room wou ld shrink as the 
amount of debt increased . The cost l)f each successive borrow i ng would rise, cii scourag ing more de bt . In  the 
prescnt /Juri /'(lSSLf [·cgi Jlle. in contr�I� ;L e�lch borrow i ng ranks equally, encourag ing o\'(�rborro wing.  The cost of 
cap i ta!  is  h igher than i t  would be u nder thc fi rs t - in-t ime reg ime because the firs t le nder ra i ses i ts rate in 
an t ic i pat ion of  later c l a i m  d i l u t ioll.  Iii. at 7 8 8-LJO. 
55 Cr Pa trick Bo l ton &. Dav id S. Sc harfs tc i n . O/Jlinw/ Dehl Slntctlire lind the NIIII/her ,,( Creditor.l, 1 0-+ 
J .  POI-. . Eco'\. I ( 1 99 6 ) .  \Vork i n g  with a ,ty i i lCd descript ion or the private borrower. Bolton anei Scharfste i n  
hypothesize that a IO\\ -qu;di ty firm \\(l u l d  lind i t  cpl imal to max i m izc i ts l iqu idation I·allie. A distre" defau l t  
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analysis s imul taneou s l y  suggests that t h e  p art ies t o  sovereign b o n d  contracts 
have every reason to s u bscribe to the broad reading as a purposive matter . A n  
ineffic ient term may neveltheless be the term i n tended and the i nefficient 
meani n g  may be the mean i ng u nderstood i n  the market. 
2.  The Defecting Lender 
Return now to the rep utational  model of sovere i g n  debt as orig i n a ll y  
described above and assume a sovereign with such an o verwhelming incentive 
to maintain its reputation that i t  w i l l  defa u l t  o n l y  involuntari l y .  In t h i s  
scenario, contract terms that make defau l t  more costly i mpose a deadweight  
cost .  B u t  a d i s ti nction opens up at  this  point  between a U A C  and a pari passu 
clause u n der the broad reading,  with the UAC i mposing a deadweight cost and 
the pa ri passu c l ause holding out a benefi t  to the cre d i tors even as i t  adds a 
frict ion.  If the sovereign debtor has a h igh-powered incentive to regain access 
to the credit market, then the lender ' s  pri m ary p roblem l ies less with the 
defaul t  i tself than with the poss i bi l i ty of opportunistic behavior o n  the part of 
other len ders i n  the wake of defaul t .  A lender w it h  no exposure to the 
defaul ted debt could break ranks w i th the u npaid c reditors, i gnore the ir 
moratoriu m ,  and make a new loan to the defau lting sovereign.  Th i s  new 
source of c redit  d i m i n i shes the sovereign ' s  i ncenti ve to reach a compos i ti on 
with its u n paid lenders. The new le nder' s very appearance satisfies the 
sovere i g n ' s  reputat ional  objective.  A s  long as such a lender is in  the pic ture,  
even a h ighly motivated sovere ign m ight fi nd strategic defau l t  a v i able option.  
Kensingto/1 Jntenzoriol 1o/  Ltd. v. Repuhlic (�l Congo'!> provides a real  world 
example of this i ncenti ve problem. Congo i ncurred the debt in question in 
1 984, but m ade no payments after 1 985. Congo conti nued to tap cre d i t  
markets i n  t h e  i ndustrial world through a who l l y  owned a l ter ego cal l ed 
SociEte Nationale des Petrole du Congo ( S N PC ) .  S NPC procured and secur ed 
fu nds for Congo ' s  petroleum operations i l1 b latant v i o l at ion of the negative 
pledge c l ause il1 the 1 984 debt c0l1tract. -'7 So low i s  the stock of loyalty among 
lending inst i tutions that b lue-chip banks in France and C anada happ i l y  d id 
being l i ke ly.  it w(luld want contracts GlITy i ng as l i llie cost as possible in the event of defau l t .  The smal ler the 
n umber o f  credi lors and the lower the ,·ot i n g barrier. the cheaper the l iquidation and the greater the valuc of 
the deht . It!. at 3.  A h igh qual i lY finn. i n  contrast, presents l i l lie risk of a d i stress defau l t .  Here, 8 0 1 lOn and 
Sch arfs[.:in see strategic defau l t  as the domi nant problem.  Factors i ncreas ing the cost of such a defa u l t-such 
as Illul t iple credi tors and tougher voting rules-enh ance the va l ue of the debt. Id. 
S() 2002 No. 1 088 (Commercial Ct .  Apr. 1 6 , 2003),  a{rd, 2003 WL 1 935493 (CA.  May 1 3 , 2003 ) .  The 
vul tur e  p la in t iff i n  this case d id  Iwt manage to procure an i n j unct ion .  
5 7  Id at 1 5 -:�6. 
2004 ) PARI PASSU AND A DISTRESSED SOVEREIGN' S  RATIONAL CH01CES 84 1 
business with  SNPC, even as i ts a l ter ego remai ned i n  defaul t  on ear l i er 
obl igati ons .  
I n  the economic mod e l s ,  the reputational mechani s m  returns to working 
order if the orig inal lenders pers uade the sovereign borrower to cheat the 
i nterloping l ender.:i8 With the i n terloper thrown i nto the composition process 
w ith the other u np a i d  lenders , the threat of refu sa l  to lend once more becomes 
a cost to the borrower. I n  the real world, a pari passu cl au se, broadly 
interpreted ,  could prov ide the unpaid creditors a more effective assist .  The 
default ing sovereign can subvert the reputational system only by ser v i c i ng its 
new borrowi ngs w h i l e  s i m u l taneously remain i ng i n  default  on i ts old 
borro w i ngs.  The b road reading pro h i bits this  ploy,  forci ng the sovere i gn to 
make pro rata payments to both old and new l enders . For the lenders, the 
problem less concerns the meaning of the c l au s e  than, as usual l y  is the case 
w i th sovere ig n  debt, with fi nding a way to get the clause enforced . E l l iott 
Assoc iate s '  action in Belg ium did just that. :i9 
3. Indirect El lforcement 
A second economic mode l  of sovereign debt is  b u i l t  around the poss ib i l i ty  
of  sanctions . Th is  theory asserts that a sovereign might  rationall y  repudiate its 
debts even when it needs a fu ture source of finance to s m ooth consu mption in 
downward cycles.  The model depicts a sovereign at the e nd of an upward 
cycle.  I t  possesses a cache o f  capital w i th wh ich to pay the debt incllrred on 
the previoLis downward cyc l e .  In the mode l ,  the solvent sovereign has a 
choice.  I t  can e i ther pay the debt or i t  can de fau l t  and i n vest the capital i n  an 
ins urance contrac t des igned to protect it against the next dow nturn. When th is  
i n vestment opportuni ty i s  avai lable, the rational sovereign defaul ts because in  
the long run sav i ng and in vestment have a h i gher return than borrowing and 
repaying.  When saving and i n vestment of the purloined capital accompany the 
de faul t ,  the sovereign grows faster, i ncreas i ng its consumption with e very turn 
of the cycle. " o I t  fo l lows that the sovereign ' s  i ncentive to p lease the credit  
m arkets is u nrel i able and sovereign debt cannot be sLlstained on a bas i s  of 
5X Klctzer & Wrighl . .III/Jill 110lc 47, al 622. 
)l) .)"(-'!:' .\'IIIJr{l text i.lccolnpany i ng notes 7-9. 
6() W i l l i am B. Eng l ish.  Uildcrsf(/ildillg flie CO.liS of S() \"('J"l'ign 01'(011/1: All lerican SIOIC Ol'iJlS ill IiiI' 
/ 840 's ,  86 ;\'.1 . Ecoi':. REV.  259. 267 ( 1 996) .  I f  [he deb lor has no place in which [0 invest,  the reputat ional  
concern caw,cs il to hllllllJ" Ihe debt .  Sec H :trold L .  Cole & Patrick J .  Kehoe,  Till' Ro/I' nj In.\ lillllio/ls ill 
Repl/fillioll Models ,,(Sm'clcigll Del>I , -,S J .  ivl oNET .. \RY Lco'\. 45. 47 ( I <)<)S ). 
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reputat ional  enforcement.  The lender must have some add it ional  recourse w it h  
w hich t o  inflict  a financ ial  cost on t h e  defau l ter.( ,f  
A quest ion arises at thi s  p o i n t  as t o  the v iab i l it y  of the l e n ders ' real world 
e n forc e me n t  arsenal . Sovereigns i n  default tend not to leave obvious assets i n  
p la in  v i e w  abroad for creditor attachment .  D i p lomatic and m i l i tary assets are 
exempt.  Central bank assets tend to have stronger i mm u nit ies i n  the U nited 
S tates and the U n i ted Kingdom than other sovereign as sets .()] S tate-owned 
air l ines are c ited as an exception to the ru le, and some Russian creditors 
man aged to bring c redible enforcement actions i n  the late 1 990s .h1 B ut as a 
general matter, the markets do not re l y  on direct enforcement.  The 
e nforcement theory of sovereign debt ac cord i n g l y  e mphasi zes i nd i rect costs 
the defaul ti n g  sovereign incurs in evading its credi tors . I ts forei g n  trade must 
be conducted i n  roundabout ways;  i t  loses access to s hort-term trade credits  
l i ke bankers ' acceptances;  and when i t  places an asset abroad a cost ly dummy 
entity must  be used.  Proponents o f  the enforce ment theory contend that eve n  i f  
the costs o f  evasion are small  i n  re lation to GNP,  the costs st i l l  w i l l  loom large 
enough in comparison to the defau lted i nterest to make rep u d i ation 
i nconvenient :  if  the costs of default do not ex ceed five percen t  of total trade, 
they say, few cou ntries show a net gai n on debt repuci iati o n .i).) 
The examp le of Congo raises doubts about the e nforcement mode l .  B u t  
cred i b i l i ty fol l ows when t h e  d irect costs o f  de fau l t  to t h e  sovere ign ' s economy 
are added to the ind irect costs of evas ion.  De fault  tends to impl icate a 
currency anci banking cris is that d i srupts the sovere ign ' s  domestic financi a l  
syste m and l i m its the avai lab i l i ty o f  fi nanc ial  re source s . Confidence dec l i nes,  
and with it  economic performance . I n  the 1 9 90s, a c urrency cris is  i mp l i e d  a 
h i  B u l ll\\· & Rogoff . .  1 / 1/,/"(/ note 5 I .  at 1 ) 7 - 5 8 :  s('e J c rcmy Bu low & Kenneth RogolT. SIII '('J"cigll Deli!: /s 
To Forgi\·e To Fo rge('. 79 A\L Ecof' , R E V ,  -13 ( 1 08 0 ) .  
62 .. \s these asscts are i mmune from prejuugmcnt attachment i n  t h e  U n i ted S tates ,1Ild U n i led K i ngdom .  
the sovereign has t i me to s h i ft them 10 a s a k  p l ace bc!"ort." ,I cred i tor  gets a chance t o  le"y ,.::xecll t ion . Celpern. 
w/'/"{( note  I ) . at I 1 2 1 -22 ,  
6.1 B o l ton & Skee l .  .\iI/'ili note 1 -1 . at 782. 
h·[ B u l ow & Rogoff. .I1 1"ro note 5 1 .  at 1 5 8-59, I (]7,  1 7-[-75 .  The mode l · s  0ppOilcnts <\rguc that rc(em 
debt crises ha\·e yielded l i t t le e\· ic1ence of lender i n terference with the trade 0 1' d e faul ters . Klcucr & Wri g h t .  
si//'m note -17 .  a t  62 2 .  Moreover. i t  i s  n o t  e n t i re l y  c ie <lr \\·hy I h e  lend ers would \\·an t to i nterfere \l i th t h e  t rade 
of a dcfau l t i ng dcbtor. at least g i vcn a d istress defa u l t .  ChOK ing thc debtor·s  tradc un l y prol ongs the d i s tress 
and further delays the payment strea lll . H i storians 11a\ c fuuml e \· ic1cncc to support both thesc,s. ("()jll/'OU' 
Eng l i sh . .I11/'UI note 5) ( a rgu i ng t hat defau l ts of Amc'rican states during thc 1 8-10s su pport the rcputat i u n a l  
model ). l I ·illi J amcs Conkl i n ,  The Theon· ,,( So \ ·ereigll De",  ( ( f ill Sj'(fill (il ldl'/" Ph ilip I I .  1 06 J .  POI . .  l�co". -\ 8 :1  
( 1 998 ) ( arguing t h a t  the h i story 01' t h c  s ix tcenth-Lcll lurv rc l a t i ', ]nsil ip hetween th e CC il(WC-;C hankers a m i  t h e  
Spanish Cl"l]\\·n su pports th..: c n forccment m o d c l  J .  
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two percent annual dec l i ne in output growth across a five-year period .h5 These 
costs of cri s i s  import a credib l e  i ncent ive to repay.
hl' 
The enforce ment  model de l ivers us  to the same ambiguous endpoint  
reached with the reputat ion mode l .  Coordinat ion problems stemming from 
UACs and pari passu c lauses sti l l  rai se a concern about postdefault  transaction 
costs . If, as some assert, sovereigns as a practical matter only defaul t  u nder 
i dentifiab ly bad cond itions
67 and strategic defau l ts are not a practical  
possib i l ity ,  i t  fol lows that the costs of defau l t  are sufficient to import i ncentives 
to perform. I ndeed, defau l t  m ight  cost too much. B ut others assert that both 
strategic defaul t  and dis tress defau l t  are act ive possibi l i t ies .
6x 
If strategic 
defaul ts are poss ib le .  then the costs of defau l t  ste mmi ng from loss of 
confidence, loss of credit ,  and trade disruption are arguably too low .  I n  this 
view, tran saction costs s temming from UACs and pari paSSll c lauses also are 
costs of defaul t  and so may have a beneficia l  deterren t  effect .  Finall y ,  note 
that what  is at bottom a defau l t  clue to distress may neverthe less entai l  a 
pol i t ical  cho ice among cost ly courses of act ion .  As long as the sovere ign has a 
choice as to w heth er to de fault s t rategy i n h e res  i n  the fac t pattern,  and added 
defau l l  costs lllay sat i sfy the cost-be n efit test. " '! 
B. De Facto Priorities ([lui ill e Terllls of the Composition 
Now assume that the sovere ign has de faulted, w hether  involuntari ly or as a 
strategic dec i s i o n ,  A n e \,',; range of c hoices opens up. The sovere ign first 
� � 
dec ides which i ssues of debt w i l l  be restructured and which w i l l  not. Hav i n g  
made that dec i s i o n ,  t h e  sovereign determ i nes the terms o f  th e compos it ion 
oackaae.
711 The J)u ri J JCISS I I  c bu se.  broacUy read, can in Huence the sovere ian ' s  
i b . b 
dec is ion in the bondholders ' favor at both stages .  
6 5  Chuhall1 & Stu rL,e negger, .Il1pm note: ..fl). at 3 ,  
(16 III. a t  6 , ,\n analogy to i nd i rect  b�ln "ruptcy custs i n  the: private seeror i �  noted SI'I' Edward I .  A l tm an . 
,\ Fllrt/wr le'IiI/liricu/ IIIH',l liglllioll IIr lize B(/I I�m/I" T  CO.lI (jII ('.Iliol l .  39 J. FI ;\ ,  1 067 ( 1 98..f ) ( est i mating indirect 
cnsts of  bankruptcy).  
6 7  Hersche l I .  Grossm an & John 13, Van H uyck. SlII 'ereigll DeI)1 os II CIII/liligelil C/oilll: ErcII,m/J/1' 
Oejilll/l, Rl'lil/(/iulioll, olld HC/lI I ll1/iol l .  78 :\ ,\ 1 . Ecoc.: , R F V .  1 088.  1 088 ( 1 08 8 ) .  
(,X Scc. cg . .  Lip'\Llrih & Nystcdl. 111/'/'(/ note "+ 6 .  at 1 03 .  
t>'1 The foregoing an.dy:-. i s  i ll lp l ies a debt ce i l ing for each sovereign , The greater the borrowcd amou n t .  
the  greater the benel! t  o r  dci'au l t  and thc m o re l i kely ddault  i s  signaled b y  the bUlTcl\I er's cost-bcnefit analys is .  
The t(ltal debt load should not  he permi tted [ 0  approach that  !t:1'el .  Jon athan [atllil & Mark GerSOyi tl, DelJI 
\ I -I/h Porcl / l iu/  f(1'/IIILiiu lilll /:  llic(lrcricui ul/li  EII//'irim/ ,'ll/oll'Si,l . ,,+1\ R E V ,  Ecm:, S ITD ,  289. 289-90 ( 1 98 1  ) , 
The deht cei l i ng \1 i l l  risco  h')I\ Cl er, as the crcdi tors· en forcement del' ices make default  more cost ly for the 
debtor. 
7ll idea l l \' .  a dis tre,;scd S(\\ 'crc it'n rt'strlld llrcs prior tt) Lkr�I U I t .  W h e n  a debtor w i t h  a current payment 
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1.  Priority (IS So vereign Choice 
[Vol . 53 
W i th corporate debt, priorit ies fol low fro m  e xp l i c i t  contract terms or are 
i mposed by legal regi mes.  A securi ty i nterest  or mortgage creates a priority 
for i ts  holder; both are enforced in bankruptcy. I n  addit ion,  the bankruptcy 
system accords priority i n  law to favored creditors, such as tax ing authori t ies ,  
new lenders , and counsel . 
S overe i g n  debt i s  differen t .  Gi v e n  barriers to enforcement ,  contracted-for 
security i nterests and subordinations have dubioLls value.7 1  T h e  priori t ies that 
count  are created as a matter of practice . A sovere ign debtor i n  d is tress ,  
although lacking cash to service a l l  o f  i t s  obl i gations ,  very w e l l  may have cash 
to service some of i ts obl i gations.  Once in defau lt,  the debtor chooses which 
c re d itors get paid and which do not.  Obl i gations  are excluded fro m  
restructuri ng,  and thereby effect ive ly  priori t ized,  i f  the sovereign deems the 
exc l u s ion convenient to its own financial  i n terests . 72 If the creditors selected 
for nonpay ment ever want to see any money, they w i l l  have to consent to 
restructuri ng .  The prnctice of selection impl ies  a powerfu l  case for the broad 
read i ng of pari passl I .  
To see the case, cons ider first the pattern of de facto priority that prevailed 
i n  the sovereign debt cr is is  of the 1 9 80s . Bank creditors were l arges t  i n  
amo u n t  a n d  made up the core group chosen for restructur i n g .  B o ndholders. i n  
contrast,  tended t o  b e  exempted. ' ;  Restructu r ing o f  dispersed bond issues was 
widely thought not to be feasible,  whether due to the e x i stence of anonymous 
bearer paper or the  presence of uncooperat ive,  l i t ig ious holders.7.! Even if  
restructuri ng i n  fact was feas i b le-Costa R ica closed a bondholder exchange 
offer in the late 1 980s7'i- it w as thought not to be cost effec ti ve.  The 
record bcgin s  to experience l iqu id i ty problems. a compos i tion can be tbe means to avel1 defa u l t .  The objective 
w i l l  be to delay nc ar-term maturi t ies, stretchi ng o u t  the payment schedule and reducing the near-term in terest 
burden.  There w i l l  be a basis for trade with the creditors i f, due to the borrowc r ' s  d i stressed condi t ion.  the 
debt is trading at a substan t ial  discount on an expectation that payment in fu ll  w i l l  not  be forthcomi ng .  The 
compos i t ion rc l ieves the near-term payment burdcn and averts thc risk of defau l t .  Because defa u l t  carrics 
co l l ateral costs fo r the creditors and dcbtor both.  avoid ance of defmr l t  of i t se l f  can cause the pricc of the bomb 
to increase. Each of Pak istan.  Ecuador. and Ukrai ne successfu l l y  c losed exchanges along these l i ncs in the l ate 
1 990s. [n the latter two cascs, Ihe price of  the bonds went up twenty to t h i rty percen t .  Li pworth & Nystcdt.  
s/Ipm note 46. at 208. Argentina and Turkey fol l owed i n  200 ! .  See Eichengreen .  SII/'UI n ote 32. ell .  3 .  
7 1 B o l ton & Skeel . SII/'f(I note 1 4 . a t  766-67 ( n oting that in  1 999 Ecuador incl udcd col l aterized B radies i n  
i t s  restructuring.  frustrat ing the market 's  expectation that rhe collateral i mpl ied a pri ori t y ) .  
72  L e e  C.  B uchheit .  Or Cr('dilOrs, Pr('jenni (///(/ Of/lenl ·ise. I. T · t. FIr-.;. L. REV . .  J U IlC 1 99 I, at 1 ·2 .  
73 The ru le \vas not absolute. C l ark. SLlIJI"(I note :29,  at  86 1 .  
7� B uchhei t ,  sll/'m notc 7 2 .  at 1 2- 1 3 . 
75 C l ark. supra note 7 3 ,  at 86 1 .  
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defau l t ing debtors of the era tended not to have iss ucd significant amounts of 
bonded debt, and so fou nd it  convcnient  to exempt their bonds and maintain 
their reputat ions in the bond markets .76 S ec ured debt,  new credits, debt u n der 
foreign exchange c on tracts , and debt subj ec t  to outside forei gn guaranties a lso  
tended to  b e  exempted,77 as  of course was debt  owing to the  IMF and Paris 
C lub members.n The treatment accorded c l asses of trade creditors and short ­
term lenders v aried from case t o  case.N As t o  t h e  b a n k s ,  there was n o  choice 
but to defau lt .  
The practice of bondholder exc lus ion was explo i ted in the Brady 
restructurings .  The banks exchanged their i l l iquid l oans for bonds , w ith the 
bonds' l iquidity and de fac to prior status both seen as sweeteners .so The story 
even circ u lated that B rady B onds were " defaul t-risk-free "  due to mandatory 
prepayment clauses, sharing c l auses, i ndiv i du a l  holde r  acceleration ri ghts, and 
the l i ke . s l  Thi s  was nonsense,  of course.  A n y  corporate bondholder could 
have disabused actors i n  the sovere i gn market of the notion that payment and 
enforcement c l auses assure performanc e ;  the soverei g n  bond market i tself 
fal s i fied the s tory w i th its h is tories of booll1s and bustS. �2 But fi nanc i al 
opt imism and the i ncredi ble stories it spawns prevai l ed for some years . 
The hond priority story continued to be told as the bond market replaced 
the banks as the pri m ary source of emerg i n g  market debt capital duri ng the 
J 990s.  The story ' s  i mplau s ib i l i ty became man i fest :  A s  bonded debt s tock 
grew i n  mag n i tude,  its inclusion i n  restructuring became i nev itable, wh atever 
the process frict ions.K ' B u t ,  in the eyes of the m arket ,  fa ls i fication did not 
occ ur u nt i l  1 999, when.  in connection w ith Pakistan ' s  restructuring, the Paris 
C l ub determined that the bondhol ders shou l d  be inc l uded along w ith other 
credi tors .K� The same th ing occurred soon thereafter with Ecuador and 
U kraine. A l l  three exchange offers c l osed s uccessfu l l y ,S) even as actors in the 
7(, Lee: C. Buchhei t. em.ls-Border LCIldillg. W/ill l 's  Dijj'erenr 'fhis Tillie :'. 16 Nw. J . I \T·L L. 8: Bus. '-l-'+. 
-19 ( 1 995 ) 
77 C l ark. s{(lm/ I1lllC 29.  al 862-63. 
n See C/c lpe:rn. )//Iirtl note 1 5 . at 1 1 27 .  
7� Clark. s{(pm note: 29.  at 363. 
�o See B uchhe:it.  S{(eUl note 72. at 1 3 . 
X I Chuham & Sturzenegger . .I'1I/'Ul note 49. at  20 . 
�::! CJ B uchhei t ,  sU/J}"a note 76. at 45 -46 ( describing bond 1l1arkct cycl ica l i ly l ,  
S 3  Ill. at 48-50. 
8.\ G e l pern . . llIlm/ note: 1 5 .  at 1 1 2-1-25 .  
�5 L ipswonh & N y sledt. .1 {(lim note '+6 . at 206.  In the l aller tlVO cases . the price of the  bonds went u p  
twcnty to Ih irty percent hecause t h e  markets. worried about holdoUls. prc: v iou:; iy  h a d  douhted I h a t  t h e  ga in  due 
[0 restructuring could be accessed at  a l l .  S uch dramatic increases may nOI occur again .  Henceforth. prices or 
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bond m arket warned of h igher borrow ing costs  for e merging markets due to 
t h e  loss of the assumed priority . '6 Meanwh i l e ,  defau l t ing sovere i gns have 
contin ued to make priority c hoices.  Whereas Ecu ador and Argenti n a  defaulted 
across the board, R ussia, the U kra i ne, and Pak istan l i mi ted their  defau lts to 
sel ected i nstru m e nts . S7 
Consider the i m p lications of the choice between the broad and narrow 
meanings of pari passLl i n  the bond market prior to Paki stan ' s  1 999 
restructuring.  The i l lus ion of priority treatment still  c irculated, even as a 
manifest r isk of i n c l u s ion i n  restructuri n g  gre w  w ith the bonded debt stock. 
U ACs made perfect sense i n  that context because they e nhanced the 
probab i l i ty of  exclus ion by add i n g to  the frictions of re s tructuri n g .  The pari 
passl l  c l ause,  broadl y  read, did the same th ing.  Under i t ,  a holdout excl uded 
from the payment stream by the sovereign cou l d  accelerate its own bond and 
then use l i t igation to force i ts point .  The better stocked the holdou t ' s  
contractual arsenal .  t h e  greater the  l i ke l  i hood of exclus ion.  
Now recons ider the nalTOW reading i n  l ight of the forego i ng .  I t  certa i n l y 
makes sense fo r the c l ause to cover the contractual  and j u r id ical priorit ies  
ide n t i fied by proponents of the narrow reading.  But to res tr ict  the c lause ' s  
reach to this l i m ited class denudes i t  o f  most real world value bec ause the 
economically perti n e n t  prior i t i es in sovereign debt are de facto .  To address 
them , the clause must cover payment itsel f as we l l  as pr ior i ty of payment.  I n  
the corporate debt context,  in  contrast, a bright  l i ne d i s t i nct io n  between priority 
and payment might m ake sense,  because legal priori t ies affect the s tatus  of 
c l asses of debt under bankru ptc y  reorgan i zation plans long before any cash 
crosses the tab l e . ';; W i th sovereign debt, where there is no bankruptcy 
reorganization ,  a bright- l i ne d istinction between prior i ty and payment makes 
l it t le  sense.  Here ,  legal ly arti c u lated priorit ies have no effect unless they 
i mpact payment; payment  and priority are the same th ing . 
2 .  Tile Terms (�f rhe Compos itio/ l 
Now aSSllme that the po ri POSSLI c l ause has not succeeded i n  i ts  pri mary 
purpose of contri buting to a successfu l  case for exclus ion fro m  restruc turing .  
hlllKls o j" s[)vcre isns  in  i m pending ci i s t rc:ss w i l l  relkct the poss ibi l i ty oj" ,successful COll1plbit iun prior t o  the 
exhaust ion or l i q u i d i t y ,  Iii. 
0(, Geipern. SIII)/"U note 1 'i .  ; I t  1 1 2..+-2'i 
0' Id, at 1 1 ..+ I .  Ecuador i n i t i a l l y  exc luded its Eurobonds even as i t  inc l uded i t:, colLncria l iLcd B r;lli ies. 
The Ill;l i kct did not s tand for tilal .  !d 
S� SeC' i 1 lj , S , c '  � 1 1 2l) ( b )  ( 2(J00 ) ( d i sl ins u i sh i ng betlVeen secured ami unsecured de b t ) ,  
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The sovereign has defaulted and no money w i l l  be paid unti l  an exchange offer 
has c losed successfu l l y .  What role ,  if  any, does the pari paSSl l  c lause play at 
this stage of the game? Finding an answer means  first addressing a 
prel i mi nary quest ion : Why do unpaid creditors vo lu ntari l y  agree to take less 
than they were promised,  instead of waiting out the distress and ins isting that 
the rene wed debtor make them whole in accordance with its original promises ? 
For a s imple scenario i n  which the debtor plausib ly can negotiate for a 
reduction in  i nterest rate or pri nc ipal amount owing, assume an enforcement 
model of sovere ign debt. Assume also that the lenders have a costly 
punishment  avai lable .  Deployment of the punishment i s  cost-effecti ve for the 
l enders, but the expected yield is less  than the princ ipal and interest owed. 
Given a l l of this, the borrower can come to the tabl e  with an offer of 
compensat ion exchanged for the l e nders ' wi thholding of the sanction. As long 
as the borrower offers more than the creditors ' expected return from the 
sanct ion, they wi l l  sett le for less th an they were original l y  promised.KlJ Further. 
the cred i tors cannot credib ly commit i n  advance to refuse to renegotiate. t)! l 
Now sw i tch to a reputat ional  mode l .  We st i l l  can pos i t that creditors 
rat ional l y  might  m ake concess ions ,  e v e n  if the sovereign remains i n  d istress .  
The overhang of u npaid loans cou l d  discourage new publ ic i n vestment hold i ng 
out a poss ibi l ity o f  hi gh returns.  If the forgiveness of some of the debt res tores 
the i nce n t i ve to invest ,  it  can be in the creditors ' i nterest to make a concession . 
The new investment benefits the sovereign ' s  economy,  mak ing the debt 
( v alued after the concess ions)  worth more than it wou ld  have been worth 
w i th o u t  the concessions anel the new i n vestment . " 1 
General i z ing, the sovere ign can get the creditors to appro ve a compos it ion 
if  the new debt i t  offers w i l l  have a market value greater than that of the 
defaulted debt.  Res truc turi ng is feas ib le i f  the sovereign can offer a surplus .  
For both the sovere i gn and the lenders, the restructuring negotiat ions address 
the d i v i s i o n  of th e surp l u s .  The debtor comes to the table w i t h  some 
bargain i ng power. Money has a t ime value ,  and the future state of the debtor' s 
economy re mai ns uncerta i n  even to c reditors possessed of fu l l  informat i o n .  
B oth fac tors can make a deal holding o u t  a resumption of  payments h ighly 
X l)  E�Jt()l1. SlfjJro note :) I .  ;'It )()-S l .  
'm Conk l i n .  SlIjlru note 5 1 .  at 40.1 -()-� l ex p l a i n i ng B u l o w ' s  and Rogoff's modc ! ) .  
') 1 S('(' .It)seph L St ig l i ll. 8:.. Andrc\\' Weiss. C,edi! Ra!iollillg ill lvlulke!.1 "'i!iz IlIljJ('r/i'Cl III/imllmifJll. 7 1  
A \ 1 .  Fen:,. RF\ . 3()J ( ! 'JS I J .  This has hecn described a s  the "debt Laffer Curve."  because forg i v i ng ran or 
the debt d r�l I l l a [ i c a l l y  increases (ile prospects for rep�[ylllen( of the rema i n ing ohl igat ion .  Kellneth R O)2(ltl 
S" l ! ljJ(l,'iill!! I  ( II! !Ve [,· jll.l'!illlliO/l.ljr" Dn 'c1i1jJillg COIlIIIIT /JeI)!. J. ECON. P[RSf' . . \V i l1ICr 1 000. at 3. 5 ,  
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attract ive .  Inst i tut ional  concerns also can i nc l ine credi tors toward acceptance. 
In addit ion, the debtor may be able  to take advantage of co ll ect ive act ion 
problems on  the creditors '  part ,  framing  a l ow-ba l l  offer w ith coerc i ve terms. 
Exit  consents, along with the threat of del i sting of the old bonds ,  further 
enhance its posit ion .n 
But  the creditors also can wie ld bargain ing power, particu larly i f  they incur 
the costs of organizing themse lves .  'Wait ing has an option value,  so the debtor 
cannot assu me that any offer hold ing out an i ncrease in the price of bonds w i l l  
garner suffic ient  support. Sweeteners may have to be added. These take many 
forms: The i nterest rate on the restructured debt coul d  be  i ncreased to 
compensate for a repayment defenal ;91 cash payments could be offered; the 
new bonds cou ld hold out enhanced l iqu idi ty ;  the terms of covenants could be 
improved ; third-party guarantees could  be added; or "value recovery rights" 
cou ld be added, caus ing payment to be  increaseel along with the performance 
of a macroeconomic factor.9-1 Upside kickers also have been devised: W ith 
exchange warrants ,  the holders get an option to increase thei r  participation; 
w ith extens ion warrants, holders get an option to exchange for longer-maturity 
ins tru ments. 9'i 
W ith such a restructur ing  negotlatJon In view as a poss ib i l i ty ,  reconsider 
the choice between a UAC and a CAC A rational bondholder might we l l  opt 
for a UAC The question is  whether the debtor w i l l  make a h igher offer if a l l  
the bonds have UACs than i f  a l l  the bonds have CACs.  There i s  reason to 
th ink i t  w i l l .'i6 Given information asymmetries and differen t  subjective 
profi les,  the creditors wi l l have a range of upset prices respecting acceptance of 
the debtor ' s  offer. If  the debtor needs one hundred percent or a supermajority, 
i t  w i l l  have to i ncrease its offer to meet  the reservation prices at the h igher end 
of  the creditors ' range.
'J7 The UAC thus counteracts the di sorgan i zed credi tors ' 
tendency to cut and run to take a lowbal l offer. Of course, a U A C  creates a 
ho ldout problem even as it causes the offer to rise. But i f  the offer makes a 
l)2 Chuh Zllll & S turzcncggcr. supro note 49, at 2 5 .  
9:1 !CI. 
9-1 Id. at 8-9. 
<)5 Id. at 8. 
% B o l ton and Scharfstcin  suggest t hat the greater the nu mber oj "  cred i LOrs and the h ighcr the percentage 
of crcditor votcs nceded to approve a renegot iat ion,  the lower the debtor fi rm ' s  surplu" in the renegotiat i o n .  
Bol lon & Sch arfstein ,  SlIlJlD notc 55.  at I X . 
97 This is the rule of downward-sloping demand. See gelleralh R ichard A . Booth. DiscoulIls alld Olher 
/vlrsleries of" COI/,orale Fill{//we. 79 CAl. .  L. REV. I OS5 ( 1 99 1 ) : Lynn A. Stout. Are Tokem'er Prellliullls Reol/.\" 
Prell/iUIIIS :' /v/arf..:el  Price. Fu ir \ill lilt'. 1Il1d COrp()mle Lml'. 99 YAl.[' L.J. 1 2:15 ( 1 990) .  
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generous  spl i t  of the surp lus ,  h o ldouts w i l l  not be so numerous as to threaten 
the deal . No one ever expects one hundred percent paliicipation i n  a 
composit ion under UACs, yet such exchange offers c lose a l l  the time u nder 
UACs on the bas i s  of supermajority acceptance. Ecuador recent ly  got n inety­
seven percent partic ipation i n  an offer wi th an e ighty-five percent m in imu m  
partic ipation requ irement.
'JR Meanwhi le ,  none of those comp laining about the 
holdout problem offers evidence that holdouts regu larly cause exchange offers 
to fai 1 .99 When offers do fai l ,  it may be that they are too low and as a resu l t  
attract something much l ess than a supermajority o f  credi tors . 
100 
The standard negative p l edge c l ause  and the pa ri passu c l ause, broadly  
read, al so p lay a rol e  in improvi ng the credi tors ' hand a t  the n egotiat ing tab l e .  
Suppose the sovereign owes $ 100 and c laims to  have the resources to support a 
payment of on ly $50 . The sovereign p lays  hardba l l ,  making a take-it-or- leave­
i t  exchange offer of a substitu te debt contract w i th a face amoun t  of $50. The 
creditors be lieve the sovereign can pay $70 and refuse to exchange. So the 
sovereign goes another round, but  this t ime makes the new debt, st i l l  w ith a 
face amount of $50, senior to the debt in  defau l t .  If the creditors do not have a 
jJari passll c lause in their o ld bonds, they w i l l  be forced to accept the offer (at 
least on an enforcement model of sovereign debt) .  The reason i s  that holding 
out leaves the holder w ith a c la im for $ 100 against an asset base that certain ly  
wi l l  be less  than $50, because the new bonds get  pa id first. 1
0 1 A l ternative ly ,  the 
sovereign could have the new debt sec ured by a payment stream at i ts di sposal , 
at least as l ong as the o ld bonds have no negative p ledge c lauses .  The addition 
of sen iority or security in the new i ssue imports an element of coerc ion-a 
powerfu l  incentive for the creditors to cave in and take hal f a l oaf l02 
'IS Chuham & S rurzenegger . .  I I I/mi note 49, at 25.  
'J'J Stuart C .  G i l son, Tro/lslIClio/ls COSlS a/ld Cupiwl S,mCI/IU' Choice: F;l'idcl/cc Fum Finoncial/y 
Dislrcsscc/ !-'inlls, 52 J. FI N .  1 6 1  ( I  ()97 ) ( showing that the holdout problem docs not seem to be so severe as to 
pl'event the accompl i shment  of n:structurings rcspecting priv ate debt, part icu l arl y g i ve n usc of coercive 
dev ices l ike ex i t  consent s ) :  see (//.1" Jean Hel wcgc, fir}\ ( '  !'Ol/g /)0 .lUI//.: BOllds Spcl/d il / De/alll(J. 54 J. F I 0I .  
34 1 ( 1 999 ) .  
I llll SCI' Marcel Kahan & B ruce Tuckman. /)(1 BOlldlwlders Lose /iDlJl .Jill//.: 8olll1 COI'CI/(III/ C//(/l/gcs :J, 66 
.I . 8 l 1S .  499 ( 1 993 ) ( s tudy ing ri rty-e ight  consent sol ic i tat ions in which an i ssuer of widely held debt requcsted 
Illod i ricat ion or exist ing c o v e n a n t s  but did not request e i ther i n t erest deferral or pri ncipal  forgiveness and 
show i n g  that in  forty-two percc n t of the cases. thc i ssuers sweetened the terms after an i n i t ia l  fa i l ure to obtai n 
c()nscnts). 
I t l l  Gui l lermo A .  Cal \'o, CJ loha i i zation Hazard and Delayed Reform i n  Emerg i ng Markets. LACEA 
Presiden t ia l  Address 13 ( Oct .  I S , 200 I ) , (/miloble (/1  httpJ/wlVw.depeco.econo.unl p.edu. ar/jcmiI20021 
trabaj02. pclf. 
J (i:, The classic corp mate case i n v o l v i ng such <In otTer is BUIT('/I I' /)('I / \ '('/' '/ 'mlllll'u\' COil'" 5.1 F. Supp.  
I 9S (f) De l .  1 943 ), otJ'r! 1 46 1'.2d 70 I t 3 d C i r. 1 944 ) .  
RSO EMOR Y LAW JOURNAL (Vol .  S3 
Because the bonds on offer in  the preceding example benefited from a 
formal priority, the creditors needed on l y  the narrow reading of pari passu to 
upset the coercive exchange offer (provided that, l ike E l l iott i n  Be lgium,  they 
found funds to attach or b lock) .  With a change of facts, they w i l l  need the 
broad reading .  In  this version, in  the second rou nd ,  the sovereign m akes the 
same offer of $50.  No priority i s  added to the new debt. The sovereign instead 
drafts the new debt so that continu ing defaul t  on the old debt triggers no 
defau l t  on the new debt and announces its i ntention to make no payments on 
the old debt unti l  the new debt is paid in ful l .  The sovereign also announces 
that i t  w i l l  del ist the old debt from the bond trading exchange, which threatens 
the holders with i l l iqui dity .  Does a rat ional  bondholder tender or not? The 
new debt ' s  priority now is de facto, but just as real .  
1 0:1 
The question whether to take the stingy $50 offer u l timately  goes to the 
credibi l ity of the sovereign ' s threat not to pay the old debt. The threat has 
credib i l ity to the extent ,  first, the sovereign can gain renewed access to the 
credi t  markets if the stingy exchange offer succeeds. and, second, the 
sovereign finds conti nu ing evas ion  of credi tor enforcement actions by the old 
bondholders cost benefic ia l .  B y  tenderi ng,  the bondholder gets a bond worth 
$50 . If the bondholder refuses to tender but the offer succeeds ,  the old debt 
l oses i ts l iquidity,  and desp i te its face value of $ 1 00, may be worth less than 
$50. If the bondholders organ ize and res i st, they may be able  to defeat the 
offer and force the sovereign to pay more than $50 . If they are di sorganized, 
the i nd iv idual bondholder may be better off tendering.  Meanwhi le,  the pari 
passu c lause, broadly read, diminishes the credib il ity of the sovereign ' s  
nonpayment threat b y  expanding the cl ass o f  poss ib le  ex post enforcement 
actions .  This makes it more l i ke ly  that the sovereign w i l l  offer a fai r  di vis ion 
of the surplus in the first p lace .  
Of course, if the sovereign does make the fai r  offer of $70 ,  an opportun istic 
ho ldout can wield the pari jH{SSlI c lause,  broad ly read , in  an attempt to get 
$ 1 00. This d isrupts the performance of the composit ion.  But the sovere ign is 
not without recourse .  Under the draft ing pattern com mon unti l  recently ,  al l it 
has to do is add to the offer an exit  consent under which the pori PUSSLI c lause 
1 0.' 'vVe see once more t h a t  with sovereign debt t h e  dist inct ion betwcen "rallk"  anc! "payment " proves 
soft: · · rank" has no mean ing unless it determines payments .  
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is removed from the old bonds.
I O !  
A majority credi tor vote w i l l  suffice to 
. 1 0' 
remove It .  ' 
C. Sumnwry 
I magine an emerg ing-market financ ing closing in ] 992 in New York. 
Counsel for the borrower appreciates the problems bound up in UACs and pori 
passlI c lauses ,  broadly read. So counse l  drafts the bond contract with a CAC 
and a pari passll c lause t hat exp l ic i t ly  states that i t  covers only contractual and 
positive law priorit ies and creates no rights with respect to disproportionate 
payments made after defau l t .  The reason, counsel explains ,  is to reduce 
frictions in a restructur ing  process that must fol low in the wake of an external 
shock to the borrower' s economy. Unfortunate ly ,  counsel explains, such a 
process wou ld h ave to inc lude the issue of bonds then in  the process of 
creat ion .  
The hypothetical  seems i ncredi ble for two reasons.  First. in 1 992, i t  was i n  
the in terest of counse l ' s  sovere ign  c l ient for bond purchasers to proceed o n  the 
assumption that the 1 980s-pattcrn exc l u s ion of bonds from restructurin g  would 
continue to prevai l .  That assu m p t i on presumably i m pacted the rate of interest 
on the bonds i n  the borrower' s favor. Secondly ,  seeking to change the 
s tandard form to rational ize i ts  operation in  the e v e n t  of defau lt would si gnal 
negat ive information about  the borro wer ' s  creditworthiness ,  impact ing the rate 
of i n tere s t  on the bonds to the borrower' s detr iment .  
To ins ist o n  the narrow mean i ng of pari paSSLl today,  now that the external 
shoc k has occu rred and restru c tur i n g  fr ictions matter more than the terms of 
the fi nanc i n g ,  arguab l y sh i fts a risk fro m  the i ssuer back to the bondholder-a 
risk previously priced, ai located. and paid for. 
[ I I .  PARI PASSU AND BOND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
Part I set out the case for the nalTow read i ng of pori possu , and the case for 
the broad read ing  fol lowed in Part 1 I .  This  Part works the confl ic t ing 
� � 
discussions through the analy t ica l framewor k  of bond contract interpretation. 
This  analysis  proceeds in  four stages :  first, li teral mean ing:  second, market 
understan d ing:  th ird .  drafting burden;  and fourth, purpose in terpretation.  The 
I ( )� .-\ l lernat ivel y . the IHI!'i PIISSII clause can be rendered ineffect i \'e by an amendment o f  the \vai ver of 
sovnc' ign i m m u n i t y ,  Sec SlIllnt Iwle 2:) ,  
1 05 Noth ing need p rev�nl  t h e  sCo\'l're ign  ['mlll doing thl' same t h i n g  \\' i lh  " l'spect 1 0  Ihe $50 offer. 
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matter can be determined and concluded at any stage, cutt ing off further 
inquiry.  
A. Stage One: Literal Mean ing 
Contract interpretation starts w i th the l iteral word. The i n terpreter puts 
herself in the shoes of an ordinaril y  reasonable person, maki ng assumptions 
respecting the reasonab l e  person ' s  usages and patterns of m ind . J06 This 
reasonab l e  reader is assumed to employ standard English usage and interpret in 
accord with i ts general l y  prevai l i ng meaning.
JIJ7 Such objective l i tera l i sm holds 
out advantages for the judic ia l  deci s ionmaker: i t  i s  neutral and even-handed, 
and di stances the judge from respons ibi l ity for the resu lt. It also l imits the set 
of  ev identiary referents, s impl ifying adjudication. Objective l itera l i sm also 
holds out  advantages for contract part ies .  Of course, the party to a complex 
contract never can know al l  of its l i teral implications ;  but l i teral interpretation 
i mports stab i l ity ( i f  not certainty) even so. The bias toward l i teral i sm app l i es 
with specia l  strength in the interpretation of pub l i c ly  traded debt. 
! ( IX 
B ond 
contract forms are i nspected repeatedl y  by experienced bus iness l awyers who 
expect standard Engl ish usage to apply to the ir  work. I ()0 At the same ti me. 
l i tera l i sm narrows the range of poss i b le resu l ts ,  decreas ing variance and 
thereby enhanc ing trading value . l l o 
1 .  The Mean ing (�l "Pari Passu i n  Prio rity of PCIY'llen t "  
How does the reasonab le reader o f  English interpret the phrase " rank at 
least pari paSSll in priority of payment" ? Professor Andreas Lowenfe ld .  i n  h is  
declaration on  behalf of E l l i ott in i t s  action against Peru , argued for a l i teral 
in terpretat ion as fol lows :  
A number o f  art ic les  h a v e  suggested that puri POSSII c l auses, though 
very common in sove re i gn loan agreements, do not  mean what they 
say,  or cannot be re l ied upon by lenders if they are d i sregarded or 
v i o l ated by borrowers . . . . I have no difficul ty i n  understa n d i n g  what 
the pari passu c l ause means : i t  means what i t  says-a given debt wi l l  
rank equal l y  w i th other debt o f  t h e  borrower. whether that borrower 
1 06 \V i l l iam W. Bratton, Jr. ,  Th e ill !Opre!CIlioll of COlltmers Con'mill" Corl)()nt!e DeiJ! Re/uliollsliil's. 5 
Co\rmozo L. REV.  37 1 .  378 ( 1 984). 
1 1)7 RESTATEMENT ( SECONLJ) OF COI\TRACTS � 202(3 lea) ( 1 98 1 ) .  
I O� See, e.g. , B road v. R ockwell  I m ' l  Corp . ,  642 F.2d 929. 9+8-5 1 ( 5 th Cir. ) (en hane l ,  cerr. dellied, -15-1 
U.S.  965 ( 1 ( 8 1 ) : Harris v. Unioll Ele e.  Co , 622 S. W.2d 239.  2+8 (11'10 .  Ct. App. 1 98 1 ) . 
1 ( )0 Brattoll, .I'llI'm nore 1 06. at :'79 .  J i ll See Broad, 642 F.2c1 at 942-43 . 
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is an i nd i vidual,  a company, or a sovere ign state , A borrower from 
Tom ,  Dick, and Harry can ' t  say " I  wi l l  pay Tom and Dick in fu l l ,  
and if there i s  anything left over I ' l l pay Harry , " I f  there i s  not 
enough m oney to go around the borrower faced with a pori j70SSli 




There i s  much to be said for Professor Lowenfe ld ' s  reading ,  Putting to one 
side the prob lem of Latin trans lation, the stress in the standard c l ause appears 
to l ie o n  the word "payment" rather than on "priority , " To a reasonab le  
English reader, "priori ty" sweeps up a range of phenomena, i nc luding 
ordering in time, and the ordering of payments in  time is what the broad 
reading seeks to regu l ate , 
The l i teral words a lso admit the narrow reading, however, Its proponen ts 
move the s tress to the words "rank" and "priority ,"  arguing that the c l ause 
targets status in  respect of payment rather than payment itse lf  
1 1 2 
The prob lem 
is  that the l imitation, thus coaxed out  of  the l i teral words ,  does not  make much 
sense in the abstract This forces the proponents to fo l low up w ith an e laborate 
expl anation of the sa l ience of legal priority in the contracting context I I :; There 
resu l ts a mandarin g loss ,  i n te l l ig ib le on ly  by reference to generations of 
practice lore . Because the matter at bottom concerns the meaning attached by 
a bondholder rather than a bond l awyer, the narrow reading, while adm itted by 
the language, cannot prevail in a contest l imited to the l i teral word. It needs 
the further ev identiary support of a showing of market understanding. 
The ensuing quest ion  is whether the broad reading,  proposed as the l i teral 
meaning, carries s Llch objective weight as to forec lose further reference to 
c ircumstance . Reference to circu mstance can open the door to the conc lus ion 
that ambiguity forecloses a stage one l i teral in terpretation. At th is  point in the 
analysis ,  the proponents of the narrow interpretation intervene sLlccessfu l l y ,  
making a more than adequate case identifying an  ambigu ity i n  the l anguage. 
Once the contextual support for the nalTow meaning is on the tab le ,  we see that 
the standard pari passlL c lause eas i ly  can be read in accordance with i t ,  making 
a distinction between "rank in priority of payment, " the status,  and 
" payment ,"  the event .  This is just the sort of showing that underscores the 
shortcoming of aggressive l iteral ism. Even as l i teral i sm holels out advantages, 
I I I Lowenfeld Dcclaration . .I'll/1m note I , '1I�1 1 1 - 1 2 , For Professor Lowcnfelcl's updated Dcc larat ion,  scc 
Professor Andrcas F, Lowenfeld.  Dec l ara t ion in the Matter of Co ur d ' /\ppel dc Bruxe l les,  R . K ,  240/03. La 
Repuhl ique de N icarag ua contre LNC lnvcstmcnts LLC el Euroclear Bank.  S . A . C . .  Jan .  27, 200-+' 
1 1 2  See SII/I/"({ text accompanying notes 36-40. 
1 11 See ,\/Ipm tcxt accompan y i n g  notes :n -42 .  
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if  it precl udes reference to context i t  can m ake things uncertain because 
particularized and ascertain able market understandings often app l y. As a 
resu lt, a door is held open for contracts, even bond contracts, to be read in 
I I �  
con text. 
At this point, the n arrow reading ' s  proponents make a literalist counter­
attack, based on the allocation of a burde n of clarity. A careful drafter wanting 
to assure attachment of the broad meaning might have added a confirmatory 
reference to the act of payment: " pari passu in priority of payment . . .  and will 
be paid as such. " " .-, A minority of pari passli clauses take this additional 
step. I I (, The very existence of more specificall y  drafted c lauses calTying the 
broad meaning suggests a distinction betwee n  the c lause ' s  two forms. Unde r  
this, b o n d  contracts are sOl1ed between those referring o nly t o  " priority of 
payment," which would take the n an"ow reading,  and those making a further 
reference to the act of payment, which wou l d  take the broad readi ng . 1 1 7 
Th is ad h oc assi gnment of a burden of clarity does not . however, tel l  us the 
meaning of the clause- i n-c h ief. A contract that adds " payment " to "priority of 
paymen t "  does not by virtue of its own e x istence dictate the meaning of a 
contract that on l y  mentions " prior i ty of payment . "  A l l  it tells us is that the 
drafter of the contract statin g both phrases believes the form of the c lause used 
more ge neral l y to be vagu ely  and inade qu ately drafted, something "ve already 
knew. and that that drafter wants to make sure the broad mean ing attach e s .  We 
are stil l left t rying to ascertain the meaning of the more common form of the 
clause .  As to that , the phrase " pr iority of pay m ent " unfortunate ly has no p l ain 
meanIng that determines the choice between the broad and narrow 
i n terpretat ions.  The sorting argu ment can win only at stage two or stage three. 
At stage two, a court applying New York law brings to bear a standard o f  
market u nderstanding. a stan dard t h at app lies when publicly traded b on ds are 
interpreted . ' "  To sustain the posited distinction at this stage reqUIre s an 
I I � .\''''' Ri:ST .\TDIE\T ( S ECO'jD) Or C00:TRi\CTS � 202( 1 )  ( 1 98 1 ). For a bond ca,e applying the ru le .  st!c 
BII CItIlIlIlI \'. /\III('I'i('(l1/ FIIUIII Rllbber ('OljJ . . 250 F. Supp.  60. 75 ( S . D , N . Y .  1 965 1 .  
1 1 5 Lee C.  B uch h e i t .  Tlte Pari Passu C/(lII.I(, S ub Spt!c i e  Aeterni tat i s ,  l'r(L FI\ .  L. REV . . Dec. 1 99 1 .  at i 2 .  
B uchheit  also oilers an el'en more el aborately drafted claust!. hi. : s e e  (11.111 Wood . .IIIi'm notc  29.  at  3Tl 
( arg u i ng that  a judge should not all:.lCh the broad meaning unless words l ike "cCj ual paymen t "  or "l'Cj ual 
treatment" appear in the c lause).  
1 1 6 I t a l y ' S  honds prov ide a n  example: " We w i l l  p a y  amounts d u e  on the debt sccurities eCj u:i I !y  and ratably 
Il i th a l l  general  loan ob l i gat ions of Italy. ' Su pplement  to Prospec tus,  US S3 .000.000.000 Repub l i c  of  I taly 
2.7Yl, Notes Due 2006 (Julle 1 6. 2003 ) 
1 1 7 Sec B uchheit  & Pam. SlIiJUI Dote 3 8 .  at 886- 8 7 :  Gulat i  & Klee,  Slip/'({ note 8, at 64). 
i i , Sh "ron Steel Corp. v .  Chase Mallilalian Ga llk. 69 1 F.2d 1 039. 1 048-5 I ( 2d Cir. 1 9 82 1 .  U'II. tim id. 
-+{)O U S  1 0 1 2  ( 1 98 .i 1 .  
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evident iary showi ng that the sovereign bond market actua l ly  dist inguishes 
between contracts that do and do not express ly  dist inguish "priority of 
payment" and "payment ." A l ternatively, a burden of c larity cou ld be i mposed 
at stage three on a normative showi ng that the bondholders rather than the 
issuer should have made things c learer. 
2. Consistent Contracts, Countel.factuals, and Slippery Slopes 
Reasonab le  persons draft i nternal ly  cons istent documents. The tradition of 
l i teral i nterpretation accordingly ru les that writ ings i n  a s i ngle tran saction 
shou l d  be interpreted together and that an i nterpretation giv ing effective 
meaning to all terms of an agreement shou ld  prevail over an i nterpretation 
leav i ng a part w ith an unreasonab le  or i neffective meaning. "� Proponents of 
the narrow mean ing contend that i t  leads to an i nternal ly  cons i stent bond 
contract that operates i n  harmony w ith the wider structure of the sovereign ' s  
obl igations, wh i l e  the broad mean ing creates i nconsistency and di sharmony. 
([ .  Other Obligatiuns 
It is argued that the broad reading makes no sense because, app l i ed 
l itera l ly ,  i t  proh ib its the sovereign from making payments that everyone agrees 
have to be made . These inc lude payments to i n ternational financial i nst i tut ions 
( lFls) l ike the I M Fl ctl and to trade creditors who provide necessary goods and 
serv ices-the pol ice,  the army, the hosp itals ,  and the m i l kman. l c i 
I Fls demand and rece ive de facto priority . Private creditors accept this 
because these last resort sources of credit  tend to be benefi c ia l . IMP bai lout 
loans can even stave off default . I �
' 
And i t  i s  true that the pa ri PUSSlt  clause 
wou ld be better drafted i f  i t  excepted these loans expl ic i t ly .  But  that 
observation does not te l l  us how the c lau se app l ies to those loans .  That the 
c lause does not mention IF! payments does not mean i t  is i ntended to cover 
them, even though it l iteral ly  could be read to cover them. Just  abou t  the on ly 
th ing that is c lear about the c l ause is  that i t  i s  not, and never has been,  
scrupu lous ly drafted. I t  fol lows that there is no reason to expect or demand 
scrupu lousness respecti ng IFIs .  
I I � RrSL\TE\Ii:'iT ( S ECOi\D )  or CO'iTR \CTS �� 202( 1 ) - ( 2 ) .  203(a) ( 1 9 8 1  ) . 
l eO Gulati  & Kke . .I'll/1m note S. at 64 1 .  
1 2 1  Id. : Wood . sLljlm note 29. at  373.  
I �2  B raHon & Gular i .  Slfl}J"(I nOle' I I .  
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Coming at this point from another direction ,  assume that the broad meaning 
attaches.  It  does not fol low that E l liott cou l d  use the clause to get  a payment 
headed to the IMF enjoined, even in Be lgium. A convention of  IMF priority 
has prevai led in the market for a half century . I �' Accordingly,  u nder a market 
understand ing of interpretation,  the standard c lause does not cover the payment 
to the I MF, and IFI payments can be excepted from the c lause ' s  reach at stage 
two. And even if there were no market u nderstanding, i t  is not  c lear why 
E l l iott would bother investing in the l aw suit-IFls h ave broad i mmunities, 
1 2� 
so an attachment probab ly  wou ld not lie .  
A s  to the police protection i n  the streets and m i l k  for the chi ldren ,  the 
standard c lause covers only "external i ndebtedness ."  This defined term tends 
to cover only obl igations in respect of money borrowed fro m  abroad . 1 2} 
Neither trade credi t  (domestic or fore ign) nor domestic obl igations in respect 
of borrowed money are covered. Note that even if they were covered the 
promise wou ld  be effecti vely  unenforceab le because the onl y  venues for 
catching such payments would be the sovereign ' s  domestic court s .  Short-term 
external borrowi ng faci l ities in s llpport of trade for essen tia l  commodit ies 
wou ld  be covered, but s llch coverage fal ls wi thin the c lause ' s  essential  
purpose: A sovereign that can trade as usual has a d iminished incent ive to 
restart payment .  Meanwhi le ,  the mil kman can be paid .  
b.  COlllzte ,foelL/a! Possi bit  i ties 
If pari passli clauses are sllch good th i ngs under the broad reading,  it i s  
asked why corporate debt contracts omit them.  I f rank and payment are the 
same thing, must not Aunt Agatha re frain from pay ing the baker if she ]S 
ignoring the butcher? Why does the bar tab omit  a pori passlt c l ause? 1 26 
The reasons are twofold .  First, before defau l t, sovereign and private debt 
are s imi lar-no one insi sts on pori passu payment because different  
obl igations have different timetables and everyone ' s  obligations are being 
serviced t ime ly .  Second, after defaul t ,  sovereign and private debt are radical l y  
different. The bar owner, Aunt Agatha' s butcher, and the corporate bondholder 
are remitted to action at law against  the bar customer, Aunt Agatha, and the 
1 2.1 G�lp�rn. SlIjJ/"({ note 1 5 . a t  1 1 22.  
1 2� !d. at I 1 20.  
1 25 See, e.g . . Prospectlls Supplenlent to Prospectus. Governillent of J a lnaica. I O . 6257c Notes Due 20 1 7 . at 
5i1-59 ( J u ne 4.  2002) (defi ning external i n debtedness to cov�r funds "borrowed or raised inc luding 
acceptances and leasing " ) . 
1 26 Buchh�it & Pam . .I'll/1m note 3 i1 ,  at 885-86. 
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corporate bond i ssuer, respecti ve l y .  Gi ve n  severe distress ,  the b an kruptcy 
system provides a m ore u ser-friendly venue for enforcing equality and 
constraining preferentia l  payments  to favored creditors than wou l d  resort to a 
further action at J aw i n  the state courts u nder a pari passu c lau se. J 27 Sovereign 
creditors do not have these exped ients ,  so their con tracts i n c lude the pari passu 
clause as a second-best (or maybe t hird-be st) solu tion . 
B u t  why,  i t  i s  asked , i f  the broad meaning attaches,  did not  enforcing 
l it igation occur earl i er? After al l ,  sovereign creditors h av e  been receiv i ng 
haircuts i n  pain fu l  restruc turing negotiations for decades even as other c l asses 
of debt have been excepted. i nc l uding,  u nti l recent ly ,  bonds. B ecause pari 
passu c lauses have been ubiquitous i n  debt contracts throughout the period, if 
they w ere worth anyth ing,  someone shoul d  hav e  gone to court to hal t  payments 
in v i o lation . l O X 
The answer to this  quest ion l ies i n  the institutional  d ifferences between 
bank and bon d-market lendi ng . Members of bank lending groups operate 
u nder cooperative norms enforced by reputational and regu l atory con­
straints . 1 2,! The normat i ve framework inc ludes,  wi th in  the group, equal 
treatment. I ;(; I f  de facto priorities al l ocated by the defau l t ing sovereign present 
a prob l e m, gro u p  organization fac i l i tates s o l ution in  the conte x t  of the 
re s tructuring negotiations the mselves .  As the source of fu nding shifted fro m  
the banks t o  the bond markets i n  the 1 990s, observers warned t h a t  t h e  days of 
gent leman l y  cooperation were over. They predicted that w ith pro l i ferating 
bondholding ,  l i t i gation in the event of d istress final l y  could be expected. " 1  
The pred iction pro ved correct .  
c. Consistency 
The proponents of the narrow reading,  appeal ing to the rule of consi stency, 
point out that syndicated loan agreements usually contain a "s haring clause" 
as we l l  as a pori passu clause .  I t  i s  argued that  if  the pori passu c l ause i s  
broadly read, these contracts cover the same function t w ice. I f  that is  true, they 
argue, the broad mean ing makes no sense, because the sharing c l ause i s  
1 .'7  S ec  .I'll/1m note 39. 
l eX B u chhei[ & P'1Il1. SII/)UI l Iote 38.  at  884. 
1 29 B uchheit .  .I'll/)/"(/ note 76. at 5 3 -54 
L�U Sel.' Buchheit & Reisner. SII/Ji"I/ note 24. at 504-05. 
I .� I  B uchheit .  SIi/"'il IlOlC 76. at 54 
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e xhaustively negotiated and drafted, although the pari pas. ;u c l au s e  is complete 
• I _�� 
Il1 a sentence . 
A number of responses can be made . First, belt-and-suspenders drafting i s  
n o t  u nusual i n  financ ial contracting .  Second, the question o f  i nterpretati o n  
arises i n  connection w it h  bond contracts, n o t  syndicated l o a n  agreements.  
Given the long, chameleon - l i ke h i story of the pari passu clause,  there is every 
reason to suppose i t  might take on a different meani n g  in respect of a bond i n  
1995 than i t  had i n  respect of a 1975  bank credit faci l ity,  i f  only  because i n  the 
case o f  the bond de facto priority was entertained as an active possibil i ty .  
Third .  the two c lau ses perform different functions.  Shar i n g  appl ie s  to the 
lenders, cons train i ng potential enfo rcement act ions by individu al banks for the 
ben efit of the other members of the lending group.  The pari pC/Ssu c lause 
covers the borrower ' s  voluntary payment act i v i ty rather than the lenders ' 
enforce me n t  activi ty ,  which by hypothesis  puts the borrower i n  an involu ntary 
pos ture . The pari passlI clause a lso reaches outs i de of a given issue ' s  group of 
ho l ders to cover pay ments to a l l  fore i g n  private lenders . It also should be 
noted that  bond contrac ts di ffer fro m  bank loan agre e ments i n  not trad it ional ly 
i mposing shari n g  duties in  re spect of uni lateral enforcement act i v i t y . 1 13 W i th 
b o n els.  the pri vate law norm of reward to the d i l i gent  credi tor prevai ls . 1 3-l Thus 
sovereign bond contrac ts permi t  a holder to accelerate its own bonds 
uni lateral l /" anel priv ate bond contracts permit a holder to sue i n d i v i dual ly  for 
mis :.;ecl paynlents . 1 1h There does not appear to be any inconsistency .  
d. 711e Sfippel)' Slope 
It i ''; sugges ted that the broad reading makes the pori passu clause a 
dan gerous i n strument-that i t  i mpl ies that a l l  postdefau !t pay ments must  b e  
p ro  rata across a l l  cre d i tors .  "vhether benefited by the c lause or not, and that i t  
1 3 2 B uchhei l IX Pam. 11 !lm! note 3 8 .  a t  88-+;  see a/so G u l at i  & KJcc, S{{rra note 8 .  a l  646. Gu lati and Klce 
abo �1I'g ue  lhat the broad read i n g  rcnders the negal i \'e p ledge and acccl eralion c l auses superfl uous.  I do n o t  
understand lhese connections.  As l o  mandatory paymcn t cbuses and turnover clauses, See S{{rra note 29.  
1 .1 ,  When the ulTicia l  scclor suggested shari ng cbuses in sovereign bonds in 1 998.  the i nvestor commu n i ty 
re jc'L·tcd i t .  Buch he i t  & Pam . .  l i I/ml n otc .3 8 .  at 884-8 5 .  
1 ., 1 1 TI I ( )\ ! I S  D.  CR . .\.'\ [).'ILL E T  , I l  . . . TH E L-'\ W Of- DeHTORS .IC;l) CReDITORS � �  6 . 1 8 , 6 . 4  I (2002 ) 
(descr ib ing iirsl- i n -lime priorilY to entixcing credi tors ); 2 id. � \ 6 . 1 0  (noting that outs ide of the de l im i ted 
bankrupt':\' nxapturc prov is ion.  pre feren t ial payments are not fraudu l e n t  con veyances and are not vo i dab l e ) . 
1 .1 '  See \1I1!UI nole 28. 
i .' "  ;\cli oil by an indclllurc trustee u f  a priv ate i ssue . i n  cOlllrast. proceeds for the  be ne fi l uf the group and 
is sub Jccl to a d i lfercnt set of rules .  Sec REVISED IVIODE L S I 1vIPUFIED [i'\ DL:\n:RE �S 6 .07,  6.08 (2000) 
( pn)\ i d i ng thal ho lder call sue on ils own bonds b u t  that  amounts col lected by trustce be pai d  pro rala ) , 
U'/ ) }  ill led iii 'i 'i B lS L\ \\'. I 1 1 5 ( 200l! ) .  
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further impl ies a lack of final ity with  respect to any non-pro rata paymen t  
received. A n on rec i p ie n t  w i l l  h av e  a n  action agai nst  the recip ien t  of any non-
1 17 
pro rata payment. . 
These are i n terest ing b u t  i mp l au si b l e  i n terpreti ve speculat ions .  The broad 
reading supports the bondholder i nterest because it forces the sovereign e i ther 
to leave the bonds out of the restructuring or bring in all c lasses of debt 
s imilarly s i tu ated, and because as long as defaul t  continues, it requ ires that any 
payment made on fore i g n  debt b e  made pro rata with respect to the debt 
cov ered by the c lause.  At n o  p o int  does the benefited bondholder make a 
promise to reject or s hare a proffered payment not made pro rata: at no p o i n t  
d o  a n y  other c lai mants make o r  receive promises respecting payments. I t  
fo l l ows that no thi rd p arty rights are created .  It  i s  d ifficu l t  t o  imagine that a 
court would make these e x tens ions,  even as i t  goes w ithout say i ng that vultures 
looking for deep pockets w i ll assert th ird-party c lai ms.  I .', 
The foregoing s hould not be taken to as sert that pori 1)({SS l f  clauses, broad l y  
read, d o  not  trigger d iffic u l t  i ssues  of app l ication . They do, with the primary 
q uest ions concern i ng part ic ular app l ications of a pari passll payment concept . 
Assume that an exchange offer h as c losed, but that a holdout has procured a 
judgment for pri ncipal plus accrued i nterest .  The is suer now is ready to m ake 
the first i nterest  payment on the n e w  bonds . What i s  puri PUSSll treatment of 
the holdout who no longer holds a bond but a j u dgment ') Does the payme n t  of 
seven cents on the dollar on the n e w  bonds mean the j udgme n t  creditor gets 
paid one hundred cents on the dol lar of i ts j udgment? The c lause i ts e l f  
provides n o  an swer. 
B. Stage Two: Morket Ullderstulldillg 
Proponents of the n arrow interpretation contend t h at the ir reading has s llch 
currency in sovere ign debt markets as to conclude the matter under the 
standard of market understandi ng .  The n arrow reading,  they as sert. embod ies 
" the market ' s  col lect ive memory of where [ the c l auses l origi nated and what 
they were des igned to achieve.  _ , 1 19 It is  the " sett led understanding " of 
1 "7  Buchheit & Pam. slIl'ra note 38 .  at 885-86. 
1 .1R Sl'e Nacional Financicra, S .N.C.  v. Chase M anhattan Bank. :2003 W I .  1 878-1. 1 5  ( S . D. N Y . .  \pr. 1-+. 
20(3 ) ( holding that holder o f  debt covered by I'llri IJUSSII c lause h�l s  110 action against unrel ateci cred i tor  
recei ving a payment in v i o l ation ). 
1 .1� Buchheit & Pam. slIpra nore 38.  at 9 1 8 . 
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practitioners in i nternational debt markets , I -IO a meamng "accepted by general 
consensus among market partic ipants . "  1
-1 1 
The discussion i n  Part I I ,  w ith its explanation of the broad meaning' s 
economic functions, goes some d istance i n  refuting this assertion because i t  
considers the interest of the bondholder rather than the memory of  the bond 
lawyer.  Any remai ning distance can be covered by a review of the legal 
commentary . At  l east one commentator c learly accepts the broad reading. 1 42 
The broad readi ng also at least appears to be w ithin the contempl ation of a 
l eading treatise writer .  1 43 Other discussants, I -I-I inc l uding the Emerging M arket 
Creditors Association (EMCA) , 1 -I5 recognize the existence of an active 
interpretive d ispute and acknowledge that many l awyers , bankers , and 
bondhol ders subscribe to the broad reading.  1 -1(, No less an authority than Lee 
B uchheit,  advancing the nan'ow meaning as one for which a " good case" can 
be made, I .17 has acknowledged that opinions d iffer on the c lause ' s  mean ing :  
One sometimes encounters a n  i nqui s it ive borrower who asks w h y  
th is  l itt le breeze off t h e  Tiber h a s  ruffled through the pages o f  h i s  
loan agreement .  T h i s  i s  when the fun starts . " I t  means you can ' t  pay 
back somebody e lse ' s  l oan if you ' re not then curre n t  on your 
payments under th i s  loan , "  is  how some b a nkers m ay expla in  it .  ; ,  It 
means you can ' t  give a preference to some other cre d i tor that you are 
not at the same t ime g i v i n g  to LI S , "  w i l l  be the i n terpretat ion offered 
by others . . . .  
1 ·10 Wood , slIew note 29, a t  372.  
1 · 1 1  B uchheit  & Pam, .I'll/Ira note 3 8 ,  at 889.  
1 -l2 Brian \v . Semkow, Sl'IIdicarilig lIl/d RI.'.\ clledlllil/g 1IIII.'J'IIiIIil!I/(Ii Filllll/cial Trollsauiol/s: II SlIn'l.'r of 
Ihl.' Legal ISSlIl.'s Ellcolllltered I7r Commercial Ballks. I S  I"T · I . L,,, w. 869, 899 ( 1 98-1 ) .  
1 -l3 Tudor John,  SIIII/'{{ note -1 0 ,  a t  9 6  ( " [The c l ause ] i s  in tended to prevent t h e  earmark i ng of  revcnues o f  
the government towards a s ing l e  cred i tor: the a l l ocat ion o f  foreign culTt:ncy reserves, and gene m l l y  against  
legal measures which have the c::rfect of pre ferri ng one set u f  creditors agai nst the others or which d i scri mi nate 
between credi tors . " ) .  The passage can be read ei ther way . The mention or " a l l ocation of fore ign cUITency 
reservcs" as a practice apparently separate from "earmark i ng" connotes a preferent ia l payment. Ill. 
l -l-l Rcference also can be made to A lliCIIlcl.' HOIliI FII II d, fllc .... Cmflo Mexicollo de Des{/ rrollo. S. /I. .  1 -13 
F.3d 688 (2d C i r. 1 99 8 ) .  reI' 'd, 527 U . S .  308 ( 1 090) .  This case was l i t i gated frol11 the Southern D istrict o f  
N e w  York through the Second C i rc u i t  to the Suprcl11c Court and hack o n  a pre l i mi nary re medies quest ion .  
The r ight  asserted was to payment under a Iwri II(lSSII c lause. A l though the i ssu e of i n terpretation was not  
l i t igatcd. the parties in i nterest appear to have a�sumed that the broad readi ilg attac hed. 
1 -1') Letter from Abigai l  M c Kenna on behal f of Board of D i rect ors o f  E:VICA .  to J udge Thomas P. Griesa 
( .Jan .  1 -1. 200-1) (on Ille with  author) ( stat i n g  lhal . . there arc conll ic t ing  vie\\ s  ;1 1l1011g lead i ng m;1rket 
part i c i p ants regarding the correct i n terpretat ion of the pari passu clausc " ) .  
1 46 B uchhei t ,  .II/pm note 72. at I I ,  1 2 : Cuiat i  & K lec . .Il1lml note 8 ,  at  6-1-) . 
1 ·1 7  8 uchheit ,  .I'llI'm note 72,  at 1 2  
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IT] he l e n der i s  n ot bei ng told anything about w here i t  w i l l  stand 
in a queue of bankruptc y  creditors. In the absence of th i s  explanation 
. . . a goodly n u m ber of bankers (and more than a few sovereign 
borrowers) seem to bel i eve t hat the pari passll covenant is there to 
compel the borrower to pay a l l  of i ts e xternal debt on a ratable  basis 
(either in terms of the am ount, or the ti m i ng,  of debt service 
payments) . . . .  I
�X 
F ina l ly ,  we turn to the trenches, where standard bond contract l anguage has 
been redrafted i n  the past year or so .  Actors working u nder G-7 auspices have 
devised new CACs adequate to the task ass igned by the Treasury . I �9 I nformal  
pressures h ave  resu lted i n  the  i n sertion of  these c lauses i n  New York 
borrowings by Mexico, Brazi l ,  Uruguay, South Africa, and many other 
countries .  
I SO 
The new CACs tend to permi t  amendment of payment terms on 
approval  of seventy-fi ve percent of the bondholders . I ) 1  The new forms also t ie 
amendment or remova l  of the i r  pori possu c lauses to the seventy-five percent 
supermajority figure . 1 52 U nder earl ier standard forms, pari passu c lauses were 
not mentioned spec ifica l ly  in  the UAC and arguably were subject to 
amendment or removal by a bondholder majority. I)1 Majori ty amendment 
makes the c lauses more v u lnerab le to removal by ex i t  consent. The inc lusion 
of the pari possu c lause in  the terri tory covered by the new CAC supermajority 
prov is ion looks l ike a g iveback :  Even as the UAC i s  abandoned, the pa ri jJossu 
c lause gets more protec tion from removal in an exchange offer, be ing elevated 
to equal dign ity w ith the bond ' s  payment terms. If the drafters of the new 
CAC attached the narrow mean ing of jJari passu, th i s  i nnovation woul d  not 
make sense. Under the narrow mean ing ,  the po ri POSSLl c lause is on ly a 
boi l erp late tec h n ical ity-a covenant covering a res i du a l  c l ass o f  borrower 
actions un l ike ly  ever to i mpl i cate the value of the bonds. One wou l d  neither 
expect such a provision to be s ingled out for removal by exit  consent nor to be 
protected by a supermaj ority amendment provis ion .  The change in the 
contract ing pattern signals strong ly that contemporary drafters e ither attach the 
1 ·1X ld. at I I ,  1 2 . 
1 ·1'.1 See Bratton & Gulat i .  slIl'ra note I I . 
1 5(J J ohn B arham. Cookillg UI' a N£'I\ '  SO/lIlioll. L\T I N F l f'  . June 20m . at 1 0 , The l is t  a lso i nc ludes Canada. 
Turkey. B e l ize. Guatemal a. Panam,,- Venezuela .  and Korea. One exception to the trend is Israe l .  w h i c h  lIsee! 
U;\Cs i n i t s  New York law regi strat ion .  For a recent repon on Ih is  fro n t .  see I f'T · l .  MONET,\ R Y  Ft ·ND. 
PROCiRESS REPORT TO THE (NT · 1 .  MONf:TJ\ R Y  A i\ D  FIN. COM ,, ! .  f)i\ CRISIS R F SOLUTION (20m ) .  ({mi/ah/e 01 
http://w ww.imL org/cxternal/n p/pclr/crI2003/engI090S03. pel f. 
1 5 1 See Uruguay Exchange Offer. ,IIII'UI note 26. at YJ. 
1 :1 2 Id. 
1 5-' The Illaller is not free frolll doubt.  'Icc SlIl'rtf noie 27 and accoi l lpanying text. 
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broad meaning or deem l ike ly its attach ment by a court apply ing a s tandard of 
market u nderstanding .  
What the market understands, then,  i s  that informed observers d i sagree 
about the c lause ' s  meaning and that the d ispute must be reso lved in court . 
Lawyerly precedents and practices do not of themselves dictate a case for the 
narrow meanlllg .  
C. Stage Th ree: Drafting Burden 
Shou ld  not the proponent of the broad meani ng bear a burden of c larity? 
Or, alternatively ,  perhaps the borrower should bear the burden of c larity on the 
ground that the narrow meaning is counterintuit ive .  Courts often dec ide 
between disputed i nterpretations by ass igning such a drafting b urden .  Once 
the burden is imposed, the case i s  decided against the party bear ing the burden.  
This is an easy route to a deci s ion and so i s  attrac tive to the court .  
Where, in a case such as this ,  inqu iry y ie lds two p laus ib le  competing 
i nterpretations, contract l aw ,  as a last resort, 1 5  I a l lows the invocation of the 
canon of interpretation contra profe relltell l ,  or interpretat ion against the 
drafter. 1 '-' As counsel for the underwriters c ustomar i ly  drafts the bond 
contrac t, I :'I> th i s  i mp l ies a burden on the bondholders, the underwriters be ing the 
bondholders ' predecessors in  in terest .  Unfortu nately ,  thi s  approach lacks a 
bas is  i n  rea l i ty in  th is  case . With old standard l anguage l i ke th is ,  there i s  no 
drafter agai nst which to construe .  
if we were to go ahead anyway and al l ocate a draft ing burden here,  we 
would do so on the ground that a given party ' s  drafter shou ld  have c larified the 
c lause. But ,  as between the two parties to the sovereign debt contrac t, no 
persuasive d istinction can be drawn that al locates th i s  responsib i l i ty ,  whether 
based on culpabi l ity or capab i l ity. A quest ion arises :  Why, g i ven this 
background of controversy, wou ld expensive l awyers put s llch a vague c lause 
i n  their contracts when a si mple sentence would clarify matters '! In fact. 
sometimes gett ing the deal c losed is both sides '  h ighest priority . Vaguely 
drafted c l auses ho ld open a matter i n  d i spute and avoid a negot iation stando ff 
that could disrupt the transact ion ' s  accompl ishment . I
'7 
As we have seen, a 
1 5,) .3 ARHlllR UCiTOi\ CORIl I " ,  COR RIi\ 0\ CONTRACTS � 559 ( 1 95 1 ) . 
1 :'5 S'['c R EST.-\TE!'.IEi'\T ( SECO�D )  OF CO.''<TRACTS * 206 ( 1 98 1 ) . 
! )(, ,S'('(' StC'ph�n Choi c'<:. C; . f"J i tl! G U i ll t i .  /l 1Il(}\ 'orioll ill BoilerjJ/a/e (�ollfr(lCls: ;\11  EIJIIJirico/ L�r£uniJ/(/liol1 
o(S(} l t 'l 'C'igii BOIli/s, 53 ["\ 101<1' L.J. 929, 990 ( 200-+). 
1 5 7 Th i s  is nOI unco mmon in Jl nancial  contract ing.  See Bratton, SII/JUI 110le i 06, at 38.:1. .. :) 5 .  
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borrower' s l awyer who ins isted on a pori POSSLl c lause u nambiguous ly  
express ing the narrow mean ing  could  d isrupt lender expectations respecting 
exclusion fro m  restructuring and also could h ave been seen to s ignal  h idden 
information about pending d is tress.
I :\� 
A lender ' s  l awyer seeking  a c lause 
unambiguous ly express ing the broad reading could d isrupt th ings too, g iven 
the existence of a l iterature advocat ing the nanow reading  and the tradition of 
sovereign discretion respect ing payment priorities .  With a draft ing tradition 
going back decades and a market satisfied by a vague ly  drafted c lause, 
incentives l ie with leaving wel l  enough alone. The draft ing lawyers and their 
c lients conscious ly  l eft the open question as to the meaning of pari passll to a 
reviewi ng judge.  
The law and economics notion of a penalty default  does not prove he lpful 
e ither. Like the common law canon of i nterpretation against the drafter. the 
penalty defaul t  appl ies  when one party to the contract has superior information 
ancl an incent ive not to disc lose it .
IW  
The penalty defau l t  puts the burden of 
c lar i ty on the party w ith the information advantage, prodding it to disclose . To 
import th is  notion into the sovereign debt context puts the burden on the 
borrower, for in a sovere ign bond negotiation lhe borrower has s uperior 
information about i ts own fin ancia l  health and i ntentions respecting priori ties 
in the event of distress .  But thi s  i s  a crude route to an endorsement  of the 
broad meaning.  A more sustained i nterrogation o f  the economic context is 
needed. 
Either proponent could have done a better job of drafti ng here . B ut nei ther 
has greater fau lt .  As between the two proponents and the ir respect ive c l ients, 
there is no pertinent dist inction that justifies a l location of an ou tco me ­
determinative drafting burden .  
D. Stage Four: Conflicting PlI Iposes ([lid Comp([rcttive E\pect([ tions 
Sh([ 1"01l Steel Corp. t'. Chase Man/z([ttan Bank ll>{l famous ly  establ ished a 
standard of market understanding i n  bond contract i nterpretation .  The market 
understanding is to be app l ied as a matter of l aw,  thus bypass ing the jury as 
we l l  as subjecti ve part iculars concerning the contracting part i es and their 
I :' K  See \1(1)) U Part I I . C .  
1 :'<) Ian Ayres & Robert (Jenner. Filli!lg Cups ill l!lculllplele CO/lli"UClS: A l l  h OIiUlnic Thcury o r  Detiurlr 
1(1111'.1. 99 YALE LI 87 .  1 27-30 r I 98() ) .  
I {)() 69 1 F.2d 1 039 ( 2d C i r. ). l e rl. r/cllied, 4ClO U . S .  1 0 1 2 r I 9 8.) ) . 
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i ntentions. ' 6 1  It tends to be forgotte n ,  however, that the parties in  Sha ron Steel 
proved no market u nderstanding sufficient to dec ide the case . The court 
instead balanced the i nterests at stake u si ng a norm of least i nj ury under 
uncertainty as to meaning:  
Whe re contractual language seems designed to  protect the  i n terests of 
both parties and where confl ict ing i nterpretations are argued, the 
contract should be construed to sacrifi c e  the princi pal i n terests of 
each party as l ittle as possib l e .  An interpretation w h i c h  sacrifices a 
m aj or i n terest of one of the parties whi le  furthering only a marginal  
i n terest of the other should b e  rej ected i n  favor of an interpretatio n  
which  sac rifices mar� i nal i n terests o f  both parti es i n  orde r t o  protect  
their  m ajor concerns. 
62 
A s imi lar approach w i l l  be requ ired in the interpretation of the pa ri passu 
c lause. As in Sharon Steel, the vagueness of the c lause ' s  l anguage combines 
with the nois i ness of the background signal s from the market to put the onllS  
o n  the judge. The case must be dec ided by reference to the purposes of the 
contract l angu age , the expectations of the parties, and the values at stake. 
Sharon Steel ' s  norm of least inj ury i s  backward- looking-it focuses on 
existing contracts and the a l location of sunk costs among the parties to those 
contrac ts, w ithout asking questions about future effects and i ncentives. 
Effi ciency considerat ions usual ly dictate a forward- looki ng approach .  Is 
SIWroll Steer s norm by impl icat ion inefficient? No, because bond contract 
interpretation is a subjec t  matter that tends to impl icate only wealth al location 
respecting past transactions .  The future presents less reason for concern than 
usual in this context because the next generation of contracts a lways can be 
rewri tten .  Once a definit ive Ne'vv York law opinion has been rendered 
respect ing puri pOSS ll ,  the interpretation i t  attaches becomes the focal  point for 
the market ' s  understanding.  New bonds wi l l be priced to renect the attendant 
r isks .  if  the market decides that the judic ial reading does not suit i ts purposes, 
the drafters of fu ture contracts can reverse the resu l t  by redrafting so as to 
reflect whatever meaning they wish to attach .  Of course, path dependencies  or 
other frictions could retard such an adju stmcnt. ' (>' B ut that worry does not 
seem cognizabl e  here, given recen t  market movement toward CACs after a 
I (> I Sa id. at 1 048-5 1 .  
! 6� I d. �ll 1 05 I . 
163 For the vi t:\\' thai network effects can re(,\I"(1 lht: rc:spon si vencss of s(;)ndard bond contract forms, see 
!'darcel Kahan & M i chael Klausner, SI{/lld(/) '(Ii�(Ifi(}1l IIlld Illliomlioll ill COll)olwe COl ll mClillg (or " 'Ihe 
EC(llIlJIll iCl of' Boi/el}!/ille " !. 8" V ,\. L. REV. 7 1 "  ( 1 99 7 ) .  
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century ' s  use of U ACs . 1 64 Accordingly, absent a showing that one reading is 
clearly superior to the other reading in respect to the future of the sovereign 
bond market, the judge safely can dispense w ith prospective impl ications and 
concentrate on the parties to the transaction in question and all s imilar past 
transactions. 
As to ex i sti ng contracts, the outcome wi l l  fol l ow from the temporal 
perspective chosen, ex ante or ex post. An ex ante perspective favors the broad 
reading.  Here the purposes of the parties are fixed as of the t ime of 
contracting, by hypothes is  during the opt imistic days of the early 1 990s. At 
that t ime, as we have seen, the 1 980s restructuring pattern sti l l  s ignaled de 
facto priority treatment for bonds. I ssuers took advantage of this  i mpression 
and pori possu c lauses figured into the i l lusion of prior i ty .  The contract price 
presumably reflected that expectation. 
An ex post point of view s ituates expectations at the t ime of defaul t ,  and, at 
least in the case of A rgent ina, recognizes the fact that restructur ing impl ies 
daunting process barriers . The balance of interests arguably tips to the narrow 
in terpretation. The primary ori g i n a l  purpose-the assurance of the 
continuance of the 1 980s practice of exc luding bonds from restructuring-has 
fai led .  There is s imply too much bonded debt to a l low its effectuation. That 
being the case, the bondholders ' best interests l ie in  a smooth restructuri ng 
process. A fter al l ,  a composit ion on ly  succeeds if the debtor holds out a 
surp lus ( assum ing the bondholders manage to organ i ze ) .  The broad reading 
makes poss ib le  after-the-fact d isruption of the compos it ion and, thus, interferes 
with the bondholder majority ' s  pursui t  of the surplus .  Now,  i t  i s  true that the 
broad readi n g  also assists the bondholders as they bargain for the largest 
possible share of the surp l us . B ut the bondholders are not w i thout contrac tual 
assi stance here, for al l 1 990s sovere ign bond contracts i ssued in New York 
contain UACs . 
The proponent of the broad reading is not w i thout an argument at this 
stage : The threat of disruption may be overb lown .  Pak istan, Ecuador, and 
Ukraine show that sovereign debt restructurings can work in this bondholder 
era. l ll:i Holdouts have not been a problem.  Credible exchange offers have to 
put value on the table .  B ondholders, inc luding vu l tures, have tended to grab 
the value and have avoided costly enforcement actions .  Furthermore, pari 
passli c lauses are vulnerable to removal by exit  consent. The vulture problem 
j ( ,.j SCI' Choi & C u l a t i ,  .\!II' / '{/ note J 5 <1  ( describing these developments in  deta i l ) . 
1 (" Sl'e Chuilalll & Sturzencggcr . .  I I I/IID note 49, at 26- 2 7 .  
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seems to concern not debt issues in recen t  compositions but  o l d  paper-either 
defaul ted issues as to which no composition ever was attempted or Issues 
subj ected to restructuring prior to use of the ex i t  consent dev ice .  
A t  no po in t  i n  th i s  analysis does the  narrow reading  attach because 
· 'priority of payment" means only legal priorit ies .  The n arrow reading 
commends i tself on the assumption that it assists a bondholder majority in  
accessing a payment stream that  is  va lue-maximizing i n  the restructur i ng 
context .  Payments are the on ly th ings that real l y  count with sovereign debt. 
IV. CONCLUS IOl 
Under th is Artic le ' s  i nterpretation of pari passu, a court l eg it imately can 
attach the llarrow mean ing, but only to the extent that i t  has been persuaded 
that process frictions pose an unduly costly barrier to sovereign debt 
restructur i ng and so attaches the narrow meaning as a means to the end of cost 
reduction.  
An oddity i ll th is  in terpretive approach must be admitted .  It imp l ies that 
pori pass l I  meant one thing (broad reading)  in  a new issue of Argentine bonds 
in  ! 994 and another thing ( narrow read ing)  in  the same bonds in  2004, given 
defaul t .  1 t  a lso impl ies that pori paSSLl might  revert to the broad mean ing in a 
new sovere ign issue contain ing a CAC that sweeps the pa ri passll c lause in to 
the supermajority amendment reg i me-as we have seen, this draft ing 
deve lopmen t  s ignals a preference for the broad read ing .  Although the meaning 
of the pori /)([SSlI  c lause does have chameleon- like properties,  th is  seems to go 
too far. 
I n terpretation that is dynamic over t ime makes perfect sense i n  this context .  
To see why . compare private debt contracting once again .  Wi th  pri vate debt, 
d is tress means bankruptcy, and one p urpose of bankruptcy i s  to put most of the 
carefu l ly drafted terms in  the debtor ' s  bond contracts in to the paper shredder. 
A lthough the contrac ts are drafted wi th a v iew to debtor di stress and are 
designed to protect the credi tor' s enforcement interest in the event of di stress, 
they turn out to be va lue-destructive to both the debtor and the cred itor when 
severe d i stress actual ly occurs. The resul t  is a val ue-conserv ing intervention 
by the state in the form of a contract-avoiding bankruptcy regime.  Economists 
are only beginn ing to articul ate theories that explain the contradict ion between 
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the ex ante rat ional  form of the debt con trac t and the same contract ' s  ex post 
d f 
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ys unctIon . 
The point  for present purposes i s  c lear enough : The shift to the ex post i n  
the interpretation o f  the pari passu clause  fol lows from the fundamentals of the 
debtor creditor relat ionship .  Where normal ly an ex ante t imeframe should  
gu i de contract i n terpretation, so  as  to protect values freely a l located by the 
contracting parties from opportunistic ex post recapture, temporal perspectives 
work different ly with debt, distress, and compos it ion .  Recognition of the 
tension between the ex ante and ex post credi tor interest  al so helps exp lai n  why 
bond l awyers have for decades perpetuated a badly drafted c lause .  The 
problem continues  with the new CACs.  If a defin i tive j udicia l  rul ing attaches 
the narrow meaning, today ' s  drafters face the problem of redrafti ng the pa ri 
passu clauses i n  the new CACs so as to make i t  c lear that the broad meaning is 
i ntended.  If they do that, however, they tie their own bondholders ' hands i n  
the event that severe d istress makes composit ion a favored outcome and 
holdout d isruption too cost ly .  
The solut ion l ies in a sovereign bankruptcy regi me . T h e  s ame econo mics 
that cause the pa ri passLI c lause to rai se an in tractable issue of contract 
interpretat ion demonstrate the bankruptcy of the U . S .  Treasury " s contrac tarian 
approach .  There is no perfect debt contrac t that is effic ient in bad t i mes as 
wel l  as in good. 
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